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作 者:唱友义 蒯继鹏 张凯 仇江波 辛洁晴[2] Chang Youyi;Kuai Jipeng;Zhang Kai;Qiu Jiangbo;Xin Jieqing(Liaoning Electric Power Trading Center,Shenyang Liaoning 110055,China;Department of Electrial Engineering,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200240,China)
机构地区:[1]辽宁省电力交易中心,辽宁沈阳110055 [2]上海交通大学电气工程系,上海200240
出 处:《电气自动化》2022年第6期43-45,共3页Electrical Automation
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助(U1966206)。
摘 要:为在交易结算中对发电商滥用了的市场力实施评估和惩罚,首先提出发电商实施市场力的恶意度指标和市场干扰度指标,综合这些指标定义发电商市场力滥用度;进而,将市场力滥用度转化为惩罚强度因子,并基于“负激励惩罚机制”,提出市场力滥用的测算方法。方法使发电商实施市场力获得的期望收益不大于被发现后遭受的惩罚,从而丧失滥用市场力的动力。案例分析检验了所提方法的可行性和合理性。In order to evaluate and punish the power generators for abusing market power in transaction settlement,the malicious degree index and the market interference degree index were proposed for the first time.These two indices were combined to define the market power abuse degree of power generators;the abuse degree of market power was converted into a punishment intensity factor,and a calculation method of market power abuse was proposed based on the“negative incentive punishment mechanism”.This method makes the expected benefit obtained by the power generators from implementing market power not greater than the punishment suffered after being discovered,thereby losing the motivation to abuse market power.Through case analysis,the feasibility and rationality of the proposed method were tested.
分 类 号:TM715[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]
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