实践理由的本体论  

The Ontology of Practical Reasons

作　　者：王华平 WANG Huaping

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系(珠海)

出　　处：《哲学分析》2022年第6期50-63,191,共15页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目子课题“中后期元伦理学研究”(项目编号:19ZDA036)阶段性成果。

摘　　要：理由基本论认为,理由性质是不可还原的基本性质,是规范领域唯一的基本要素。对理由基本论来说,一个不可回避的重要问题是,理由是什么?对于这一问题,目前有两种主要观点:命题主义和事态主义。命题主义认为理由是命题,事态主义认为理由是事态。然而,命题主义不能满足理由性质的不可还原性限制,事态主义不能满足理由性质的基本性限制。它们之间的张力可用真理同一论来消解。同一论认为,作为真理承载者的命题并不是由作为真理制造者的事实使之为真,而是同一于事实。同一论吸收了当代心灵哲学中的内容外在论思想,避开了元伦理学中的“规范问题”,为实践理由的本体论提供了恰当说明。Reasons fundamentalism holds that the property of being reasons is irreducibly fundamentalproperty,and is the only fundamental element in the normative domain.For reasons fundamentalism,whatreasons are is an inevitable important problem.There are two main views about this problem:propositionalismand statism.Propositionalism holds that reasons are propositions,while statism holds that reasons are states ofaffairs.But propositionalism cannot satisfy the restriction from the irreduction of the property of being reasons,and statism cannot satisfy the restriction from the fundamentality of the property of being reasons.The identitytheory of truth,which holds that propositions as truth-bearer are not made true by facts as truth-maker but are identified with facts,can satisfy both restrictions.The identity theory avoids“the normative problem”in metaethics,and provides an adequate account of the ontology of practical reasons.

关 键 词：实践理由 命题主义 事态主义 真理同一论 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]