康德先验演绎中的自我意识的同一性  

The Identity of Self-Consciousness in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction

作　　者：徐秋实 XU Qiushi

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2022年第6期64-78,191,共16页Philosophical Analysis

摘　　要：盖耶尔和阿利森都认为亨利希从自我意识的同一性出发重构的康德的先验演绎论证错误地预设了自我意识同一性的先天确定性。然而自我意识的同一性应被理解为逻辑同一性,只是相对于主观时间而非客观时间而言的,它的先天确定性并不会因预设成问题的形而上学意义上的先天综合而无法确立。并且与阿利森的观点相反,虽然自我意识的同一性只是逻辑的同一性,但它的先天确定性是现实的而非仅是可能的,这也是先验演绎的成功所要求的。Guyer and Allison both argue that Henrich’s reconstruction of the argument of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories from the identity of self-consciousness wrongly presupposes its a priori certainty.Yet the identity of self-consciousness should be understood as logical identity which iswith respect to subjective times other than to different objective times,so it does not presuppose a kind ofproblematic a priori synthesis in the metaphysical sense because of which Guyer and Allison think it fails tobe established.And contrary to Allison’s view,although the identity of self-consciousness is merely logicalidentity,its a priori certainty is real rather than merely possible,which is also required for the success of the Deduction.

关 键 词：自我意识的同一性 先验演绎 逻辑同一性 先天综合 

分 类 号：B5[哲学宗教—外国哲学]