管理层权力与业绩指标选择中的机会主义行为——基于监管治理的抑制作用  

Managerial Power and Opportunistic Behaviors in the Selection of Performance Indicators——Based on the Inhibitory Effect of Regulatory Governance

作　　者：钟鑫 申云 李海龙 陈昌华[3] ZHONG Xin;SHEN Yun;LI Hai-Long;CHEN Chan-Hua(Sichuan Academy of Social Sciences,Chengdu 610072;School of Economics,Sichuan Agricultural University,Chengdu 611130;School of Management,Xi Hua University,Chengdu 610039)

机构地区：[1]四川省社会科学院,成都610072 [2]四川农业大学经济学院,成都611130 [3]西华大学管理学院,成都610039

出　　处：《软科学》2022年第10期124-130,共7页Soft Science

摘　　要：以新版《上市公司股权激励管理办法》为视角,基于2017—2020年A股上市公司股权激励计划中的业绩考核指标,研究了管理层权力与业绩指标选择中的机会主义行为。结果发现:管理层权力越大,越不会从利润指标中扣除非经常性损益,越不会选择同行业绩作为对比,所选择的指标个数也越少;将持股5%以上的高管排除在激励对象外,能够有效抑制上述机会主义行为;相较于监管治理,内部治理机制,如股东大会治理与数字化治理对机会主义行为不具有抑制作用;总经理是机会主义行为的主导者,当他们被排除在考核之外时,业绩指标选择中的机会主义行为不再显著。Based on the new "Measures for Equity Incentive Management of Listed Companies",this paper studies relationship between management power and the opportunistic behaviors of performance measures selection based on the performance assessment indicators in equity incentive plans of A-share listed companies from 2017 to 2020.Results show that the more powerful the management is, the less they will deduct the extraordinary recurring gains and losses from profit, the less they will choose the peer performance index for comparison, and the fewer the number of measures they choose.Moreover, excluding executives with stakes of more than 5% can effectively curb the opportunistic behaviors.Further, it shows that contrast to regulatory government, internal governance mechanism, such as shareholder meeting governance and digital governance, have no inhibitory effect on opportunistic behaviors.Manager is the leader of opportunistic behavior, when the CEOs are excluded from the incentive object, the opportunistic behaviors in the selection of performanceis no longer significant.

关 键 词：管理层权力 股权激励 业绩考核指标 机会主义行为 监管治理 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]