罚款分担契约下绿色供应链最优减排技术选择研究  

Optimal Emission-Reducing Technology Selection for Green Supply Chain Under Penalty-Sharing Contract

作　　者：程粟粟 张帆[1] CHENG Su-Su;ZHANG Fan(School of Economics and Finance,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710061)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,西安710061

出　　处：《软科学》2022年第10期131-137,共7页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(18AJY004);陕西省软科学重点项目(2020KRZ007)

摘　　要：考虑清洁工艺与末端治理两种减排技术,通过博弈论方法研究由单一制造商与单一零售商构成的绿色供应链的减排技术选择问题,并进一步探讨罚款分担契约对绿色供应链决策的影响。结果发现:减排努力水平随着环境税的提高而增加;对于该两种减排技术,罚款分担契约均可协调绿色供应链;环境税不影响制造商的减排技术选择,最优的减排技术为末端治理技术。但减排效率影响制造商的减排技术选择,当减排效率较低时,制造商倾向于选择末端治理技术;否则,制造商将选择清洁工艺技术。只有当制造商拥有较高的减排效率时,清洁工艺技术下的供应链总利润和社会福利高于末端治理技术,否则,末端治理技术会更优。Considering two emission-reducing technologies,i.e.,cleaner process and end-of-pipe treatment,this paper investigates the emission-reducing technology selection of a green supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer,and further analyzes the impact of penalty-sharing contracts on green supply chain decisions by game theory.Results show that,with the increase of environmental tax,the level of emission-reducing efforts increases.For these two emission-reducing technologies,the penalty-sharing contract can fully coordinate the green supply chain.Environmental tax not affects the manufacturer’s selection of emission-reducing technology,and the optimal emission-reducing technology is end-of-pipe treatment technology.However,the emission-reducing efficiency impacts the manufacturer’s selection of emission-reducing technology.Namely,when the emission-reducing efficiency is relatively low,the manufacturer tends to select the end-of-pipe treatment technology.Otherwise,the manufacturer will select the cleaner process technology.The channel profit and social welfare under the cleaner process technology are higher than that under the end-of-pipe treatment technology if and only if emission-reducing efficiency is high.Otherwise,the end-of-pipe treatment technology will be better.

关 键 词：清洁工艺 末端治理 罚款分担契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]