政府补贴下考虑公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链定价决策  

Government Subsidies Under Consideration of Fairness Concerns the Double Channel Green Supply Chain Pricing Decisions

作　　者：杨浩雄[1] 杨阔 顾子跃 YANG Hao-xiong;YANG Kuo;GU Zi-yue

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学电商与物流学院

出　　处：《产经评论》2022年第5期31-42,共12页Industrial Economic Review

基　　金：北京市哲学社会科学项目“北京市网购食品安全及监管研究”(项目编号:18GLC085,项目负责人:杨浩雄);2022北京工商大学研究生科研能力提升计划项目(项目负责人:杨阔)。

摘　　要：政府采用不同补贴策略引导传统单一销售渠道的供应链向绿色供应链转型升级,补贴策略与因此而产生的供应链成员公平关切行为共同作用于双渠道绿色供应链决策和利润。基于研发补贴和价格补贴两种不同策略,考虑公平关切因素,构建“制造商线上销售—零售商线下销售”的二级双渠道绿色供应链博弈模型,探究不同补贴水平和公平关切程度对产品绿色度、最优定价以及利润的影响。结果表明:两种补贴策略均对供应链利润产生积极的影响,同一补贴水平下价格补贴策略的效果更好,但随着补贴水平的提高,两个渠道的绿色产品销售价格均会提高,这与政府实施补贴的目的是相悖的,因此,需要将补贴水平控制在合理的范围;研发补贴策略下零售商的公平关切会提高零售商的利润、降低制造商的利润,但价格补贴策略下制造商的公平关切对双方利润均不利。Based on two different policies of R&D subsidy and price subsidy,and considering the factors of fairness concern,this paper constructs a dual channel green supply chain game model of“manufacturer s online sales-retailer s offline sales”,to explore the impact of different subsidy levels and fairness concern on product greenness,optimal pricing and profit.The results show that subsidy policies have a positive impact on the profits of the supply chain,and the effect of the price subsidy policy is better under the same subsidy level.However,the sales price of green products in dual channels with the increase of the subsidy level,which is contrary to the purpose of the government s subsidy.Therefore,it is necessary to control the subsidy level within a reasonable range.When the manufacturer is subsidized,the retailer s fairness concern will increase the retailer s profits and reduce the manufacturer s profits.When the retailer is subsidized,the manufacturer s fairness concerns are detrimental to the profits of the manufacturer and the retailer.

关 键 词：双渠道绿色供应链 政府补贴 公平关切 定价策略 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F062.9[经济管理—国民经济]