基于物理不可克隆函数的防御功耗分析攻击对策  

Defensive Power Consumption Analysis Attack Countermeasures Based on Physical Unclonable Function

作　　者：杜浩然 Du Hao-ran(Newcastle University,Newcastle upon Tyne,NE17RU,UK)

机构地区：[1]纽卡斯尔大学,英国纽卡斯尔NE17RU

出　　处：《科学与信息化》2022年第23期115-122,共8页Technology and Information

摘　　要：本文研究的重点是将物理不可克隆函数(PUF)应用在简易逻辑电路中,使其免受两种代表性的功耗分析攻击,即简单功耗分析和差分功耗分析的有效性。文章首先介绍了实验的测试平台、基准设置以及测试流程;其次收集归纳了实验数据并对其进行了简单功耗分析(SPA)或差分功耗分析(DPA);最后对解析得出的功耗曲线与原电路或PUF电路通过相似流程得出的曲线进行对比,并讨论研究结果及其在实际应用中的意义。The focus of this paper is to apply Physical Unclonable Function(PUFs)to simple logic circuits,so as to protect them from two representative power consumption analysis attacks,namely the effectiveness of simple power analysis and differential power analysis.This paper first introduces the testing platform,benchmark setting and testing process of the experiment;secondly,collects and summarizes the experimental data,and performs simple power analysis(SPA)or differential power analysis(DPA);finally,compares the power consumption curve obtained by the analysis with that obtained from the original circuit or PUF circuit through similar processes,and discusses the research results and its significance in practical applications.

关 键 词：侧信道攻击 简单功耗分析 差分功耗分析 物理不可克隆函数 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]