检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:郭珂 郭雪萌[1] 周煜皓 GUO Ke;GUO Xue-meng;ZHOU Yu-hao(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China;School of Business,Qingdao University,Qingdao Shandong 266071,China)
机构地区:[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]青岛大学商学院,山东青岛266071
出 处:《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》2022年第4期113-123,共11页Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
基 金:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“‘双循环’背景下产业链布局优化及结构升级路径研究”(2021YJS307);北京市习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想研究中心项目“‘双循环’背景下北京产业链战略布局优化及结构升级路径研究”(21LLYJC024);国家自然科学基金资助项目“城市轨道交通PPP模式‘客流-价值流’绩效评价体系研究”(71973009)。
摘 要:选取2011—2020年A股非金融类上市企业为研究样本,实证考察地方政府补助对企业R&D投入的影响。研究发现:地方政府补助是企业R&D投入的重要驱动因素,但因其在部分企业所引发的积极与消极经济后果,导致补助行为对于部分企业而言具备双重性,即地方政府补助在触发部分企业僵尸“感染”效应的同时,抑制企业R&D投入,致使其与企业R&D投入呈现“倒U”型关系。异质性研究发现:上述关系在不同财务特征企业之间存在显著差异。为使得地方政府补助更为有效激发企业研发积极性,应降低政企间信息不对称程度并加强R&D活动过程性监管,对地区企业的R&D活动项目建立专项化绩效评估系统与甄选机制、协调推进“去产能”和“放管服”以减少部分企业过度依赖政府补助,逐渐剥离“僵尸企业”的政策性负担与寻租动机。A sample of A-share non-financial listed enterprises from 2011 to 2020 is selected to empirically investigate the impact of local government subsidies on enterprises’R&D investment.The study finds that local government subsidies are an essential driver of R&D investment,however,the resulting positive and negative economic consequences of subsidies in some enterprises lead to a dual effect,i.e.,local government subsidies trigger the“infection”effect of zombies in some enterprises and inhibit R&D investment at the same time.This results in an inverted U-shaped relationship between local government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment.The heterogeneity studies find that the above relationship is significantly different from enterprises with different financial characteristics.To make local government subsidies more effective in stimulating enterprises’R&D enthusiasm,we should reduce information asymmetry between government and enterprises,strengthen the process supervision of R&D activities,establish a special performance evaluation system and selection mechanism for R&D activities of regional enterprises,and coordinate and promote“de-capacity”and“decentralization”to reduce the overreliance of some enterprises on government subsidies,so as to gradually remove the policy burden borne by zombie enterprises and eliminate their rent-seeking incentives.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.62