互联互通、排他性交易行为与平台竞争  

Interconnection,Exclusive Behavior and Platform Competition

作　　者：房林[1] 李美萱 FANG Lin;LI Mei-xuan(School of Economics,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学经济学院,天津300222

出　　处：《研究与发展管理》2022年第6期42-54,共13页R&D Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“平台企业治理”(21&ZD135);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“平台竞合下的双边定价机制与政府引导政策研究——基于内外部R&D动态演化路径”(17YJC790030);国家自然科学基金应急管理项目“内部R&D创新投入与外部资源获取对平台竞合的影响机制及政府规制研究”(71740014)。

摘　　要：如何协调数字平台创新发展与监管之间的关系一直是学界、实业界关注的重点,本文以央行推动条码支付平台互联互通为研究背景,把平台开放与排他性行为结合起来,运用圆周模型对平台开放程度与平台不同策略选择产生的竞争效应进行比较分析。研究结果表明:互联互通可以促进条码支付平台创新,改善消费者效用和社会福利,产生更高的社会价值,实现公平与效率的兼顾;互联互通后,排他性策略使平台具有竞争优势,但随着实施排他性策略平台数量的增加,会使所有平台的商家规模和利润受损,商家效用、社会福利增加。本文不仅丰富了平台排他性交易行为的研究视角,而且扩展了经济学对平台经济的理论研究,也为平台反垄断提供了更具针对性的科学监管政策建议。How to coordinate the relationship between innovation and development of digital platform and supervision has always been the focus of academic and industrial circles.Taking the central bank’s promotion of the interconnection of bar code payment platforms as the research background,combining platform openness with exclusive behavior,it used the circle model to compare and analyze the competitive effects of platform openness and different strategy choices.The results show that interconnection can promote the innovation of bar code payment platform,improve consumer utility and social welfare,generate higher social value,and realize the balance of fairness and efficiency.After interconnection,the exclusive strategy gives the platform a competitive advantage.However,with the increase of the number of platforms implementing the exclusive strategy,the business scales and profits of all platform are damaged,but the utility of businesses and social welfare increase.It not only enriches the research perspective of platform exclusive trading behavior,but also expands the theoretical research of economics on platform economy,and also provides more targeted scientific regulatory policy recommendations for platform antitrust.

关 键 词：平台经济 互联互通 排他性交易行为 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]