研发操纵如何影响研发人员薪酬溢价的经济后果?  

How Docs R&D Manipulation Affects the Economic Consequences of R&D Personnel’s Compensation Premium?

作　　者：余玉苗[1] 史有容 YU Yu-miao;SHI You-rong

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财务研究》2022年第6期53-65,共13页Finance Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72072133)。

摘　　要：研发人员的薪酬溢价可以激发其创新动力,但也可能成为企业为迎合高新技术资质认定等要求而进行研发操纵的手段。本文以2017~2019年高新技术领域的A股上市公司为样本,检验研发操纵行为对研发人员薪酬溢价经济后果的影响。研究发现,研发人员薪酬溢价能够提升企业的创新总量和创新质量,面研发操纵会削弱研发人员薪酬溢价对创新质量的正向效应。机制检验发现,风险承担能力在薪酬溢价与企业创新产出之间起中介作用。异质性检验表明,在不具有高新技术资质的企业样本中,研发操纵对研发人员薪酬溢价与创新质量关系的负向调节效应更显著。本文的研究不仅为迎合式研发投入失效的原因提供补充证据,也为政府完善相关政策提供参考。Compensation premium can motivate R&D personnel to innovate,but it may also become a means for enterprises to conduct R&D manipulation to meet the requirements of high-tech qualifications.The article explores the impact of R&D manipulation on the economic consequences of R&D personnel’s compensation premium with a sample of A-share listed firms in high-tech fields from 2017 to 2019.The results show that R&D personnel's compensation premium can promote the quantity and quality of innovation,but R&D manipulation will weaken the positive effect of compensation premium on innovation quality.The mechanism tests suggest that risk-taking ability plays a mediating role between compensation premium and innovation output.Heterogeneity tests also found that in firms with non-high-tech qualifications.R&D manipulation has a more significant effect on the relationship between R&D personnel's compensation premium and innovation quality.The article not only provides supplementary evidence for the failure of catered R&D investment,but also provides a reference for the government to improve the policy effect.

关 键 词：研发人员薪酬溢价 研发操纵 企业创新 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]