管理者过度自信、企业投资和股票收益  

Managerial Overconfidence, Corporate Investment, and Stock Return

作　　者：李双琦[1] 江唐洋 朱沙 王伟 Li Shuangqi;Jiang Tangyang;Zhu Sha;Wang Wei(School of Finance,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China;School of Internet,Anhui University,Hefei 230039,Anhui,China;Experimental Teaching Center of Economics and Management,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学金融学院,重庆400067 [2]安徽大学互联网学院,安徽合肥230039 [3]重庆工商大学经济管理实验教学中心,重庆400067

出　　处：《金融经济学研究》2022年第4期96-111,共16页Financial Economics Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(21BJY051);重庆市教育科学“十四五”规划项目(K22YG208167)。

摘　　要：以2012—2020年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证研究管理者过度自信对股票收益的影响及作用机制,研究发现,过度自信管理者所经营企业的股票收益显著低于非过度自信管理者所经营企业的股票收益;管理者过度自信通过强化投资过度而对股票收益产生显著负向影响。进一步研究发现,融资现金流的增加可能通过强化过度自信管理者的投资决策行为而使其所经营企业的股票收益更低;市场竞争通过影响企业投资行为与股票收益之间的关系而在管理者过度自信经由企业投资影响股票收益的传导路径中发挥调节作用,且这种调节作用对不同生命周期的企业存在异质性。研究结论为企业在不同融资现金流和市场竞争环境下制定管理者选拔机制、规范企业投资行为提供了经验证据。Using A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2020 as the research sample,this study empirically investigated the effect of managerial overconfidence on stock return and its mechanism.This study found that the firms run by overconfident managers recorded significantly lower stock returns than the firms run by non-overconfident managers,implying that managerial overconfidence had a significant negative effect on stock return through the reinforcement of overinvestment.Furthermore,the research revealed that increased cash flow from financing activities could result in lower stock returns among firms run by overconfident managers through the reinforcement of their investment decision behavior.Market competition has a moderating effect on the transmission path of managerial overconfidence to stock return through firm investment by influencing the relationship between firm investment behavior and stock return.This moderating effect is heterogeneous across firms with different life cycles.The conclusions of this study provide empirical evidence for firms to establish their manager selection mechanism and regulate firm investment behavior under different cash flows from financing activities and competitive market environments.

关 键 词：管理者过度自信 企业投资 市场竞争 股票收益 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]