供应商不同行为偏好下的供应链企业契约选择研究  

Research on Contract Choice of Supply Chain Enterprises under Different Behavior Preferences of Supplier

作　　者：王永龙 贾镜渝 蔡继荣 WANG Yong-long;JIA Jing-yu;CAI Ji-rong(School of Business Administration,Chongqing Technology and Business University,Chongqing 400067,China)

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学工商管理学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《系统科学学报》2022年第4期91-95,共5页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(17AGL007)。

摘　　要：在供应商主导的Stackelberg博弈中,考虑了其存在行为偏好的四种情形:风险中性者;仅具有浪费厌恶偏好;仅具有缺货厌恶偏好;同时具有缺货厌恶和浪费厌恶偏好。同时,针对批发价格契约和收益共享契约,研究了供应商不同行为偏好下供应链上下游企业的契约选择问题,并探讨了供应商的浪费厌恶程度和缺货厌恶程度的变化对二者的决策行为和期望利润的影响。研究发现,较批发价格契约而言,收益共享契约可激励零售商订购量的增加;若供应商仅具有缺货厌恶偏好且其缺货厌恶程度较小,则供应商(零售商)会更偏好于选择批发价格契约(收益共享契约),反之同理;若供应商为风险中性者、仅具有浪费厌恶偏好或同时具有缺货厌恶和浪费厌恶偏好,则零售商会更偏好于选择收益共享契约,而供应商会更偏好于选择批发价格契约。In the supplier-led Stackelberg game, four situations of supplier’s behavioral preferences are considered. The risk-neutral has the waste aversion preferences, the stockout aversion preferences and the waste-stockout aversion preferences. At the same time, aiming at wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract, this paper studies the contract choice problem of upstream and downstream enterprises in supply chain under different behavior preferences of the supplier, and discusses the influence of the change of waste aversion degree and shortage aversion degree of supplier on their decision-making behavior and expected profit. It is found that, compared with wholesale price contract, revenue sharing contract can stimulate retailer to increase his ordering volume;if the supplier only has stockout aversion preferences and the degree of stockout aversion is small, then the supplier(retailer) will prefer to choose wholesale price contract(revenue sharing contract), and vice versa;if the supplier is a risk-neutral, with only a waste of aversion preference or both stockout and waste-aversion preferences, the retailer will prefer to select the revenue sharing contract, and the supplier will prefer to select the wholesale price contract.

关 键 词：契约选择 浪费厌恶偏好 缺货厌恶偏好 

分 类 号：N949[自然科学总论—系统科学] F274[经济管理—企业管理]