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作 者:王小玫 董雅浩 邓博夫[1] Wang Xiaomei;Dong Yahao;Deng Bofu
机构地区:[1]西南财经大学会计学院 [2]成都理工大学商学院
出 处:《管理会计研究》2022年第6期76-81,共6页MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING STUDIES
摘 要:产业升级的压力客观要求中国企业积累并激励人力资本不断创新。本文研究了中国上市公司员工持股计划和高管股权激励的基本事实:首先,从整体发展趋势来看,员工持股计划上升趋势不明显,但高管股权激励随时间推移呈现更高频率的变化。该趋势可以被产业升级的压力所解释。其次,员工持股计划的激励期限虽然较长,但激励次数和激励强度不及高管股权激励。就股票来源而言,本文发现员工持股计划更倾向于利用股票回购直接形成长期利益绑定。再次,员工持股计划的特征变化受到产业升级压力的影响。产业升级压力较高的行业,员工持股的激励强度更低,激励期限更短,说明中国产业升级所带来的创新压力导致企业倾向于激励核心高管和骨干员工,而不是基层员工。The pressure of industrial upgrading has objectively urged Chinese entrepreneurs to accumulate and incentive human capitals to innovate constantly.This paper examines the basic facts of employee stock ownership plans(ESOP)and executive equity incentives in Chinese listed companies and finds the following facts.First,from the overall development trend,ESOPs show an insignificant upward trend,but executive equity incentives show a higher frequency over time,the feature of which could be explained by the pressure of industrial upgrading.Second,though the incentive duration of ESOPs is a bit longer than executive equity incentives,the incentive times and incentive intensity of the former are inferior to the latter.In terms of stock sources,this paper finds that ESOPs tend to utilize stock repurchase to bind long-term interests with employees.At last,industries with higher industrial upgrading pressure have lower incentive intensity and shorter incentive periods for employee stock ownership,indicating that the pressure to innovate from industrial upgrading urged Chinese listed companies to incentive executives and core employees,other than ordinary employees.
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