政府补贴下考虑利他偏好的供应链扶贫效果  

Poverty alleviation effect in a supply chain with altruistic preference under government subsidy

作　　者：罗天龙 张庆宇 LUO Tianlong;ZHANG Qingyu(College of Management,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518055,Guangdong Province,P.R.China;Research Institute of Business Analytics and Supply Chain Management,Shenzhen University,Shenzhen 518055,Guangdong Province,P.R.China)

机构地区：[1]深圳大学管理学院,广东深圳518055 [2]深圳大学商业分析与供应链研究所,广东深圳518055

出　　处：《深圳大学学报（理工版）》2023年第1期100-108,共9页Journal of Shenzhen University(Science and Engineering)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(21AGL014)。

摘　　要：考虑由1个有利他偏好的供应商和2个制造商组成的供应链,2个制造商分别生产存在竞争的扶贫产品和非扶贫产品(一般产品),其中,扶贫产品制造商决策投资力度水平,并接受政府补贴.建立动态博弈模型分析政府补贴、利他偏好程度及扶贫产品市场份额三要素对供应链企业的影响,从“绝对贫困”和“相对贫困”视角对供应链扶贫效果进行数值分析.结果表明,增强三要素均有助于减贫,并有效提高扶贫投资水平、扶贫产品产量、市场价格及扶贫产品制造商利润,但一般产品制造商利润有所下降;扶贫产品市场份额与两产品竞争强度是影响扶贫效果的关键因素;提高政府补贴或扶贫产品市场份额能有效提高供应商利润及供应链总利润,为供应链成员实现帕累托改进提供基础.研究结论为扶贫产品稳健实现市场化提供理论参考.This paper studies the influence of government poverty alleviation policy and altruistic preference on supply chain decision-making in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two manufacturers. The two manufacturers produce poverty alleviation products and non-poverty alleviation products(general products) respectively, which are competing in the same market, and the manufacturer who produces poverty alleviation products chooses a level of investment and receives government subsidies. The dynamic game model is established to analyze the influence of government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products on supply chain decision-making. Through numerical analysis, the effectiveness of supply chain in poverty alleviation is analyzed from the perspective of absolute poverty and relative poverty. The results show that enhancing these three factors(government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products) can effectively improve the level of poverty alleviation investment, the output of poverty alleviation products, the market price and the profit of poverty alleviation product manufacturers, however the profit of general product manufacturers is decreased. The market share of poverty alleviation products and the intensity of competition between these two products are key factors which are influencing the effect of poverty alleviation. Increasing the market share of government subsidies or poverty-relief products can effectively increase the profit of suppliers and the overall profit of supply chain, which provides a foundation for supply chain members to realize Pareto improvement. The conclusion provides theoretical reference for the stabilization and marketization of poverty-relief products.

关 键 词：决策分析 政府补贴 扶贫 利他偏好 企业社会责任 竞争性供应链 博弈论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] C934[经济管理—国民经济]