自由权利能否至上?——论桑德尔与罗尔斯之争  

Can the Right to Liberty Be Supreme?——on the Sandel-Rawls debate

作　　者：程有保 CHENG Youbao(School of Marxism,Shangrao Normal University,Shangrao Jiangxi 334001,China)

机构地区：[1]上饶师范学院马克思主义学院,江西上饶334001

出　　处：《上饶师范学院学报》2022年第5期33-38,120,共7页Journal of Shangrao Normal University

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(17BZX112)。

摘　　要：自由权利至上性是指在各种伦理元素之间的关系考量中,自由权利是最终决定性力量,它不被任何其他伦理元素所决定,任何其他伦理元素都由它所决定。罗尔斯从密尔式的自由权利观洞察到自由权利非至上性的缺陷,坚决捍卫自由权利至上性。桑德尔主张自由权利至上性必然导致理论不自洽,政治伦理与人的本质存在不可分割的关系,自由权利离不开善。唯物史观认为,自由权利的政治伦理地位不是纯粹哲学思辨,要从生产力和生产关系的现实冲突中去解释,才能正确地确定自由权利的政治伦理地位。The supremacy of the right to liberty means that among the various ethical elements, the right to freedom is the ultimate decisive force, which is not determined by any other ethical element, and instead, determines them. Rawls inspects the defects of the non-supremacy of the right to liberty from the Millsian view of the right to liberty, and resolutely defends the supremacy of he right to liberty. Sandel argues that the supremacy of he right to liberty inevitably leads to theoretical inconsistencies, that political ethics are inseparable from the essence of man, and that he right to liberty is inseparable from goodness. The materialist view of history holds that the political and ethical status of he right to liberty is not pure philosophical speculation, and must be explained from the actual conflict between productive forces and production relations in order to correctly determine the political and ethical status of the right to liberty.

关 键 词：自由权利 至上性 政治伦理 桑德尔 罗尔斯 

分 类 号：D091[政治法律—政治学]