考虑双寡头制造商不同竞争行为的供应链定价策略研究  

Supply Chain Pricing Strategy Considering Different Competitive Behaviors of Duopoly Manufacturers

作　　者：张怀阁 程鹏 ZHANG Huai-ge;CHENG Peng(School of Business Administration,Guangdong University of Finance&Economics,Guangzhou 510320,China;School of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Education,Hubei University of Automotive Technology,Shiyan 442002,China)

机构地区：[1]广东财经大学工商管理学院,广州510320 [2]湖北汽车工业学院创新创业教育学院,十堰442002

出　　处：《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第4期88-94,共7页Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金(批准号:2021A1515011569)资助;广东省社会科学基金(批准号:GD20CGL55)资助。

摘　　要：由两个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链系统中,假定两制造商生产具有一定差异程度的产品且均通过零售商销售。当零售商为Stackelberg领导者时,研究两制造商不同竞争行为(Bertrand博弈、Collusion博弈以及Stackelberg博弈)对供应链成员定价策略和利润的影响。研究结果表明:当双寡头制造商合谋时,供应链成员会制定高价,此时零售商利润和渠道成员总利润都最低,但双寡头制造商的利润总和最高;当双寡头制造商之间Bertrand竞争时,供应链成员会制定较低的价格,此时零售商利润和渠道成员总利润最大,双寡头制造商的利润总和最低;随着产品间竞争程度的增加,无论采用哪种竞争行为,渠道成员的价格与利润都会增加。Considering a supply chain system composed of two manufacturers and one retailer,the two manufacturers produced products with a certain degree of difference and sold them through the retailer.Taking the retailer as Stackelberg leader,the pricing strategies and profits of supply chain players were studied under different competitive behaviors of two manufacturers(Bertrand competition,collision and Stackelberg competition).The results show that when duopoly manufacturers adopt collusion strategy,supply chain players will set high prices,while the retailer′s profit and total channel profit are the lowest,but the total profit of duopoly manufacturers are the highest.When duopoly manufacturers adopt Bertrand competition,supply chain players will set lower prices,and the retailer's profit and total channel profit will reach the maximum,but at this time,the total profit of duopoly manufacturers will be the lowest.No matter what kind of competition behavior is adopted,the price and profit of channel players will increase with the increase of competition between products.

关 键 词：供应链管理 定价策略 竞争行为 博弈论 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]