国企高管超额薪酬与自愿披露社会责任:“为公利”还是“解私忧”?  

SOE Executive Excess Compensation and Voluntary Disclosure of the Corporate Social Responsibility:“For Public Interests” or “To Relieve Private Concern”?

作　　者：陈艳[1,2] 黄诗华 陈邑早 王雪霁 CHEN Yan;HUANG Shihua;CHEN Yizao;WANG Xueji(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian,Liaoning 116025,China;China Internal Control Research Center,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian,Liaoning 116025,China;School of Accounting,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan,Shandong 250014,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [3]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2023年第1期42-50,共9页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL055);教育部人文社会科学基金项目(20YJA630007)。

摘　　要：基于代理理论,运用回归分析模型,依据社会责任披露意愿和质量的相关数据,考量国有企业高管超额薪酬对自愿披露社会责任的影响。结果发现:国有企业高管超额薪酬与企业自愿披露社会责任正相关;高管薪酬超过契约参照点的程度越高,超额薪酬对自愿披露社会责任质量的影响程度就越高,会导致企业的股价崩盘风险升高的经济后果,高管超额薪酬与企业业绩显著负相关。鉴于此,可为企业自愿披露社会责任的“薪酬辩护”动机提供证据。Based on the agency theory, this paper, using the regression analysis model and relevant data of willingness and quality of corporate social responsibility(CSR) disclosure, explores the impact of excess compensation of state-owned enterprise executives on voluntary disclosure of social responsibility. The results show that: Executive excess compensation in SOEs is positively associated with voluntary social responsibility disclosure. The higher the executive compensation exceeds the contractual reference point, the higher the impact of excess compensation on the quality of voluntary disclosure of social responsibility, which will lead to the economic consequences of the increased risk of stock price collapse. The excess executive compensation is significantly negatively correlated with corporate performance. Given this, it provides evidence for the “compensation justification” motive of voluntary CSR disclosure.

关 键 词：国有企业 高管超额薪酬 社会责任 自愿披露 薪酬辩护 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]