国家治理、税收遵从与小微企业课税——基于税务部门与小微企业演化博弈分析  

State Governance, Tax Compliance and Taxation of Small and Micro-Enterprises——Evolutionary Game Analysis of Tax Authorities and Small and Micro-Enterprises

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作  者:孙璐 王妍文 孙伟 SUN Lu;WANG Yanwen;SUN Wei(School of Finance and Taxation,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510320,China;Guangdong Provincial Key Laboratory of Big Data of Finance and Taxation,Guangdong University of Finance and Economics,Guangzhou,Guangdong 510320,China)

机构地区:[1]广东财经大学财政税务学院,广东广州510320 [2]广东财经大学广东省财税大数据重点实验室,广东广州510320

出  处:《财经理论与实践》2023年第1期78-85,共8页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基  金:广东省哲学社会科学规划项目青年项目(GD22YYJ08);国家社会科学基金一般项目(22BJY073)。

摘  要:通过构建税务部门和小微企业的演化博弈模型,揭示了小微企业税收遵从与税收的国家治理相互作用机制,并采用仿真模拟进一步探究影响两者均衡的重要因素。研究发现:将小微企业引入税收网络,对小微企业课税,促进其税收遵从度的提高是税收国家治理效应的重要体现;税务部门对小微企业的优惠政策和处罚是促使小微企业税收遵从的关键因素,税务部门应持续地对小微企业实施减税降费的优惠政策,同时加强税收监管;提高小微企业对政策的参与度及政府的信任程度可以促进税收发挥国家治理作用。By constructing an evolutionary game model between tax authorities and SMES, this paper reveals the interaction mechanism between tax compliance and state governance, and further explores the important factors influencing both using simulation methods. The main conclusions are: firstly, taxing on SMES to improve their tax compliance is an important embodiment of states governance;secondly, the tax cut policy and penalties of the tax authorities for SMES are the key factors to promote the compliance of SMES in taxation. The tax authorities should continue to implement preferential tax cut policy for SMES and strengthen tax supervision;thirdly, increasing the participation of SMES in policies and the trust degree of government can promote the role of taxation in state governance.

关 键 词:国家治理 税收遵从 小微企业课税 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F276.3[经济管理—企业管理] F812.42[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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