基于双渠道供应链的创新手机产品定价研究  

Research on Pricing of Innovative Mobile Phone Products Based on Dual Channel Supply Chain

作　　者：张铁山[1] 纵文静 杨卫忠[2] ZHANG Tieshan;ZONG Wenjing;YANG Weizhong(Col.of Economics and Business Administration,North China Univ.of Tech.,100144,Beijing,China;College of Business,Jiaxing University,314001,Jiaxing,China)

机构地区：[1]北方工业大学经济管理学院,北京100144 [2]嘉兴学院商学院,嘉兴314001

出　　处：《北方工业大学学报》2022年第6期37-46,共10页Journal of North China University of Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“企业战略决策团队自反性功效与实现机制研究”(13YJC630204)。

摘　　要：运用博弈论的方法,构建包含制造商、零售商和消费者的两阶段动态博弈模型,通过数值仿真对比分析了创新与不创新两种情形下双渠道供应链各成员的均衡定价及利润。结果表明:零售商线下销售价格更高,销售量更大,创新产品销售价格始终高于初始版本产品销售价格;制造商推出的产品创新程度较低时,不利于供应链利润创收。最后结合手机产品市场实际情况提出了相应的对策建议。By using game theory,a two-stage dynamic game model including manufacturers,retailers and consumers is constructed.Through numerical simulation,the equilibrium pricing and profits of each member of the dual channel supply chain are analyzed under the conditions of innovation and non innovation.The results show that the offline sales price and sales volume of retailers are higher,and the sales price of innovative products is always higher than that of the original version of products;the low level of product innovation introduced by manufacturers is not conducive to the profit generation of the supply chain.Finally,according to the actual situation of the mobile phone market,the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 创新手机产品 产品定价 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F124.3[经济管理—国民经济]