政府补助、高管薪酬粘性与研发投入的关系研究  

Research on Relationship between Government Subsidies,Executive Compensation Stickiness and Research and Development Investment

作　　者：张春颖[1] 章文 ZHANG Chunying;ZHANG Wen(College of Management,Changchun University,Changchun 130022,China)

机构地区：[1]长春大学管理学院,长春130022

出　　处：《长春大学学报》2023年第1期23-27,共5页Journal of Changchun University

基　　金：吉林省哲学社会科学规划项目(2022J53)。

摘　　要：我国进入经济新常态后,代表着企业发展潜能的创新能力受到社会各界的广泛关注。研发投入作为学术界公认量化企业创新能力的指标,受到国内外学者的广泛讨论。选取2014-2019年A股上市公司为研究对象,利用实证方法分析政府补助、高管薪酬粘性与研发投入之间的关系。结果表明:研发投入随着政府补助的增加而增加;高管薪酬粘性不会削弱政府补助与研发投入之间的正向关系,并且在非国有控股上市公司中,高管薪酬粘性对政府补助与研发投入之间的正相关关系起正向的调节作用。After China entered the new normality of economy, the innovation ability of enterprises which represents the development potential has been widely concerned by all circles of the society. Research and development(R&D) investment, as a recognized indicator to quantify the innovation ability of enterprises, has been widely discussed by scholars at home and abroad. A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019 are selected as the objects, the relationship between government subsidies, executive compensation stickiness and R&D investment is analyzed by the empirical method. The results show that R&D investment increases with the increase of government subsidies;the executive compensation stickiness does not weaken the positive relationship between government subsidies and R&D investment, and in non-state-owned listed companies, the stickiness of executive compensation plays a positive moderating role on the positive relationship between government subsidies and R&D investment.

关 键 词：政府补助 研发投入 高管薪酬粘性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]