不连续多目标博弈的逼近定理  

The Approximation Theorem for Discontinuous Multiobjective Games

作　　者：牟玉霜 贾文生 MOU Yushuang;JIA Wensheng(College of Mathematics and Statistics,Guizhou University,Guiyang Guizhou 550025,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州大学数学与统计学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《江西师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2022年第6期606-609,共4页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(12061020,71961003);贵州省自然科学基金(20201Y284,20205016,2021088);贵州大学科研基金(201811)资助项目.

摘　　要：逼近定理是最优化问题、博弈问题等若干非线性问题的重要研究内容.该文针对一类不连续多目标博弈,给出了在有限理性条件下该博弈问题的逼近定理,为有关不连续多目标博弈问题的稳定性和求解算法提供了理论支持,并反映了不连续多目标博弈问题的有限理性是对完全理性的逼近.Approximation theorem is an important topic of nonlinear problems,such as optimization problems,game problems and so on.In this paper,an approximation theorem for a class of discontinuous multiobjective games under the bounded rationality is given,which provides a theoretical support for the stability and algorithm of discontinuous multiobjective game problems,and it reflects that the bounded rationality of the discontinuous multiobjective game problems is the approximation of full rationality.

关 键 词：不连续博弈 逼近定理 有限理性 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]