实际控制人超额委派董事与企业投资效率  

Actual Controller Over-appointing Directors and Enterprise Investment Efficiency

作　　者：李璐[1] 薄文 院茜 LI Lu;BO Wen;YUAN Xi(School of Accounting,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2023年第1期10-22,共13页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

摘　　要：本文以2007—2020年中国沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验实际控制人超额委派董事对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现,实际控制人超额委派董事能够提高企业投资效率,该结论在经过一系列内生性和稳健性检验后依然成立。作用机制分析表明,实际控制人超额委派董事通过缓解信息不对称和管理层短视来提高企业投资效率。进一步研究发现,这种提升作用在非国有企业、行业竞争度较高的公司中更为明显。本文的研究结论有助于上市公司深化对超额委派董事的理解,为公司合理安排董事结构、提高投资效率提供参考。Based on A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets of China from 2007 to 2020,this paper studies the influence of over-appointing directors by actual controllers on the investment efficiency of firms.The result suggests that the excess appointment of directors by actual controllers can improve the investment efficiency of the firm, which is still valid after a series of endogeneity and robustness tests.The analysis of mechanism shows that the actual controller over-appoints directors to influence the investment efficiency of enterprises by alleviating the information asymmetry of enterprises, reducing the management’s short-sighted behavior.Further research shows that in non-state-owned enterprises and highly competitive companies, the excessive appointment of directors by actual controllers has a more significant impact on the investment efficiency of enterprises.The research conclusion is helpful for listed companies to deepen their understanding of over-appointed directors, and provide enlightenment for companies to rationally arrange director structure and improve investment efficiency.

关 键 词：超额委派董事 投资效率 信息透明度 控制权市场威胁 管理层短视 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]