货币环境、高管薪酬与银行风险承担  

Monetary Condition,Executive Compensation and Bank Risk Taking

作　　者：沈宇 胡广雨 SHEN Yu;HU Guang-yu(School of Finance and Trade,Liaoning University,Shenyang Liaoning 110036,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学金融与贸易学院,辽宁沈阳110036

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2023年第1期72-77,共6页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

摘　　要：文章选取2007—2020年中国38家上市银行的非平衡面板数据,使用固定面板回归模型,研究了高管薪酬与银行风险承担之间的关系,并进一步分析了货币环境对高管薪酬与银行风险承担关系的影响。结果表明,高管薪酬与银行风险承担正相关,同时也可能存在正“U”型关系,货币环境会削弱高管薪酬的风险承担激励。异质性检验表明,高管薪酬的风险承担激励以及货币环境对高管薪酬银行风险承担激励的削弱作用主要集中于非国有大银行。因此,从控制风险的角度出发,文章认为对银行高管薪酬进行适当的监管和限制是必要的。另外,在宽松货币环境下,制定合适的薪酬限制措施,有利于更好地控制银行风险。Based on the unbalanced panel data of 38 listed banks in China from 2007 to 2020,this paper studies the relationship between executive compensation and bank risk taking,and further analyzes the impact of monetary environment on the relationship between executive compensation and bank risk taking by the fixed panel regression model.The results show that executive compensation is positively related to bank risk taking,and there may also be a positive U-shaped relationship.The monetary condition will weaken the incentive of executive compensation of risk taking.The heterogeneity test shows that the risk taking incentive of executive compensation and the weakening effect of monetary environment are mainly concentrated in non-state-owned large banks.Therefore,from the perspec-tive of risk control,it is necessary to properly supervise and limit the compensation of bank executives.In addition,under loose monetary environment,with appropriate salary restrictions,it is conducive to better control bank risks.

关 键 词：货币环境 高管薪酬 银行风险承担 金融监管 金融赋能 

分 类 号：F83[经济管理—金融学]