承诺价格与再谈判--高校教师流动的博弈分析  

Promised price and renegotiation:a game analysis of the flow of collegeteachers

作　　者：张鹏[1] ZHANG Peng(School of Economics,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang,Jiangxi 330013)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学经济学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《价格月刊》2023年第2期23-29,共7页

基　　金：江西省教育科学“十三五”规划项目“‘双一流’战略背景下江西高校师资流动的影响因素与规制策略研究”(编号:18ZD022)。

摘　　要：在“双一流”战略背景下,高校通过支付承诺价格降低教师流动。在后续承诺合约执行中高校可能违约,教师将和高校再谈判。通过分析高校教师再谈判的背景后,从高校和教师再谈判前的博弈、再谈判单次博弈和再谈判重复博弈三个维度进行了博弈分析,研究发现:在再谈判前的博弈中教师的占优战略是“申请流动”,而高校倾向于选择“不同意”策略;在单次再谈判博弈中高校的占优策略是“不遵守承诺价格”;在再谈判重复博弈中高校和教师均不存在占优策略,在满足一定条件时可能出现高效率的纳什均衡。为提升再谈判合约效率应延长再谈判合约时间长度,加强规制高校和教师的机会主义行为,成立再谈判合约执行监督机构。Under the background of“double first-class”strategy,colleges and universities reduce the flow of teachers by paying the promised price.In the implementation of the subsequent commitment contract,the universities may breach the contract,and the teachers will renegotiate with the universities.After analyzing the background of college teachers’renegotiation,this paper conducts a game analysis from three dimensions:the game between colleges and teachers before renegotiation,the single game of renegotiation and the repeated game of renegotiation.The research finds that:the dominant strategy of teachers in the game before renegotiation is“application for flow”,while colleges and universities tend to choose the strategy of“disagreement”;in the single renegotiation game,the dominant strategy of colleges and universities is“not abiding by the promised price”;in the repeated game of renegotiation,there is no dominant strategy for universities and teachers,and there may be an efficient Nash equilibrium when certain conditions are met.In order to improve the efficiency of renegotiation contract,we should extend the length of renegotiation contracts,strengthen the regulation of opportunistic behavior of universities and teachers,and establish a supervision agency for the implementation of renegotiation contracts.

关 键 词：承诺价格 再谈判 师资流动 机会主义 

分 类 号：F726[经济管理—产业经济]