霍布斯“决定论”中的“神义”何以可能?——以反驳布拉姆霍尔的“自由意志神义论”为线索  

How is“Divine Justice”possible in Hobbes’Determinism?--Take the refutation of Bramhall’s“Free-will Theodicy”as a clue

作　　者：余云海 Yu Yunhai(School of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai,200433)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学哲学学院

出　　处：《哲学评论》2022年第1期118-143,共26页Wuda Philosophical Review

摘　　要：霍布斯的决定论认为,一切事件与行动都受到必然的因果性决定,其中神作为第一因与第一施动者。这一理论遭到同时代布拉姆霍尔主教的批判,他以“神的正义”难题提出挑战,认为霍布斯的决定论危及到“神的正义”。在他看来,只有诉诸经院神学的“自由意志神义论”才能证成“神的正义”。本文旨在论证,首先,霍布斯的决定论保留了自由与必然之间的相容性,在罪行问题上无需预设“自由意志”就可以免除神的罪责;其次,他批判了肯定意义上的“神义论”证成,只提供一种关于“神的正义”的可能辩护。Hobbes’determinism holds that all events and actions are determined by causal necessity,with God as the First Cause and the First Agent.This theory was challenged by Bishop Bramhall,who criticized that it undermines“divine justice”.On his view,one way out of the criticism is to develop a“freewill theodicy”to justify“divine justice”from the scholastic tradition.I argue that instead of affirming the theodicy justification,Hobbes offers a possible defense.First,we can attribute Hobbes soft-determinism,a claim that free action is compatible with casual necessity.Second,on the basis of soft-determinism,“divine justice”can be preserved without presupposing“free will”.

关 键 词：霍布斯 决定论 意志 自由 神义论 

分 类 号：B561.22[哲学宗教—外国哲学]