高管腐败、内部控制与中国上市公司对外直接投资  

Executive Corruption, Internal Control and Chinese Listed Companies’ OFDI

作　　者：王疆[1] 黄姝淼 WANG Jiang;HUANG Shumiao(School of Business,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《经济论坛》2023年第2期102-116,共15页Economic Forum

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学规划青年课题“中国企业走出去如何“择邻而居”——多理论视角的研究”(2017EGL010)。

摘　　要：文章选取2006—2019年沪深A股上市公司海外直接投资事件为研究样本,基于企业异质性角度,探究了中国上市公司高管腐败行为以及公司内部控制水平对企业对外直接投资的影响。研究结果表明,高管存在增加投资谋取私利的动机,上市公司的高管腐败行为会显著提高中国上市公司对外直接投资;当考虑企业内部控制水平时,内控控制水平越高,上市公司越可能更谨慎地制定投资决策,因此对企业对外直接投资具有抑制作用。同时,企业内部控制措施可以调节高管腐败在对外直接投资中的影响,抑制高管腐败对企业对外直接投资的促进作用。基于所有权异质性和行业异质性的检验发现,在制造业企业、非国有企业中,上述影响更显著。This paper selects the OFDI events of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2019 as the research sample, and based on the perspective of enterprise heterogeneity, explores the impact of executive corruption and the level of internal control in Chinese listed companies on enterprise’ OFDI. The results show that: Executives have the motivation to increase investment for personal gain, and the executive corruption of listed companies will significantly promote enterprises’ foreign direct investment;the higher the level of internal control, the more likely listed companies are to make investment decisions more carefully, which has inhibitory effect on enterprises’ OFDI. At the same time, enterprises’ internal control measures can adjust the impact of executive corruption on OFDI and inhibit the promotion of executive corruption on enterprises’ OFDI. The above impact is more significant in manufacturing enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises. This paper studies the impact of executives’ corruption in OFDI activities of listed companies, which provides some references for enterprises taking more rational OFDI decisions.

关 键 词：高管腐败 内部控制 对外直接投资 企业异质性 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]