虚拟行为与道德直觉  

Virtual Actions and Moral Intuitions

作　　者：张子夏 ZHANG Zi-xia(School of Public Adminstration,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing 210023,China)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学公共管理学院,南京210023

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2022年第12期38-44,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：勒克提出的“玩家困境”指出,我们倾向于对虚拟谋杀行为和虚拟恋童行为作不同的道德判断,但从理由上看,两者似乎都可以因为没有对人造成伤害而免于成为不道德的行为。为解决该问题,巴特尔和阿里分别从质疑理由和揭穿直觉的方式入手,尝试让我们的道德直觉和道德理由融贯。然而,这两种解决方案都存在适用范围问题。或许更好的解决方案是说明直觉差异源自以下两种心理偏误:(1)仅将虚拟恋童行为视作邪恶品格的显现;(2)仅将虚拟恋童行为视作变态行为。在消除这些心理偏误的情形下,我们对这两种虚拟行为的道德判断应趋于一致。According to Luck’s “gamer’s dilemma”, we have a strong tendency to form different moral judgments regarding virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. But reason suggests that these two actions are morally on a par since neither causes any harm to anyone. To solve this problem, Bartel and Ali try to restore the coherence of our moral intuitions and moral reasons by casting doubt on the reasons and intuitions in question. However, both solutions fail to cover all cases of the virtual actions at issue. It might be better to explain the moral intuitions in question in terms of the following psychological biases:(1) we tend only to take virtual pedophilia as a manifestation of evil character traits;(2) we tend only to deem virtual pedophilia as a pervert action. Insofar as these psychological biases are dispelled, our moral judgments about these two virtual actions will find their convergence.

关 键 词：玩家困境 虚拟行为 道德直觉 道德判断 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]