问询函的市场监管效应——基于企业营销战略的经验证据  

Market Regulation Effect of Comment Letters:Empirical Evidence Based on Marketing Strategy

作　　者：徐亚飞 李园园 XU YaFei;LI YuanYuan(Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070;Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070 [2]山西财经大学工商管理学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《财贸研究》2023年第1期98-110,共13页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目“转型升级背景下消费者幸福感形成机理与提升策略研究”(71832002);国家自然科学基金面上项目“强势品牌广告竞争的溢出效应及弱势品牌应对方式研究”(71972082);山西省科技创新计划项目“什么样的营商环境可促进资源型企业转型?”(2021W070)。

摘　　要：以2015—2018年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,从营销战略角度检验证券交易所发布的问询函的市场监管效果。研究发现,问询函可以显著抑制企业激进的营销战略,且主要是通过提高企业面临的融资约束程度实现的,上述结论在经过内生性问题解决、替换核心变量测量指标等一系列稳健性检验后依然成立。异质性分析结果显示,在低产品市场竞争以及高股票波动率的情况下,问询函对企业营销战略的抑制效果更明显。Based on the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in 2015-2018, this paper examines the regulatory effect of comment letters issued by stock exchanges from the perspective of marketing strategy. The study finds that companies that received comment letters are more likely to reduce tendency of aggressive marketing strategies, and the comment letters could play a regulatory role by improving the degree of financing constraints faced by enterprises. The above conclusions are still valid after a series of robustness tests such as solving the endogenous problem and replacing the measurement indicators of core variables. The results of heterogeneity analysis show that under circumstances of low product market competition and high stock volatility, the inhibitory effect of comment letters on marketing strategy is more obvious.

关 键 词：问询函 营销战略 融资约束 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]