非国有股东治理与企业财务风险——基于国有企业混合所有制改革的经验证据  

Non-state Shareholder Governance and Corporate Financial Risk-- Empirical Evidence Based on Mixed Ownership Reform of State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：张世宇[1] 张勇[1] 陈丽娜[1] Zhang Shiyu;Zhang Yong;Chen Lina

机构地区：[1]西南科技大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《财政科学》2023年第1期85-103,共19页Fiscal Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(项目编号:18CJY055)。

摘　　要：本文以2008-2019年国有上市公司为研究对象,从股权结构以及高层制衡两个维度检验了混合所有制改革中非国有股东治理对国有企业财务风险的影响。研究发现:基于股权层面的治理无法有效降低国企财务风险,而高层制衡的治理效应能够通过优化股权激励、缓解非效率投资等机制降低国有企业财务风险。进一步研究发现,在国有企业内部治理水平薄弱以及外部环境不确定性强烈时委派董事参与治理对企业财务风险的缓解效果更为显著;在地方国企中非国有股东委派董事参与公司治理能有效降低国企财务风险,且这种治理作用会随着地区市场化程度的提升更为有效。上述结论丰富了企业财务风险和国有企业混合所有制改革相关领域的研究文献,为推进混合所有制改革进而改善国企财务风险提供了有益启示。Taking state-run listed companies from 2008 to 2019 as the object,the paper evaluates the influence caused by non-state shareholders*management on the financial risk of state-owned enterprises from two perspectives of equity restriction and high-level management.The study finds the management at the level of equity restriction is tough to execute substantially.However,the governance effect of high-level checks and balances can mitigate the financial risks of SOEs through mechanisms such as optimizing equity incentives and mitigating inefficient investments.In-depth analysis indicates assigning directors to attend management is more influential on enterprise financial risk mitigation when the internal management is inefficient while external environment is uncertain.Meanwhile,only under the background of local state-run enterprises can the directors attending enterprise management appointed by non-state-run shareholders effectively decrease the risk of financial,which can be more enhanced with the development of area marketization.The conclusion of this paper not only offers a way for the mixed ownership reformation to prevent the damage of state-run assets but also enriches the academic study on the financial risk and mixed ownership reformation of state-run enterprises.

关 键 词：混合所有制改革 国有资产 财务风险 金融稳定 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]