公立医院内部审计、国家审计协同的博弈模型分析  

Game Model Analysis of the Cooperation of Internal Audit and National Audit in Public Hospitals

作　　者：冯婧 谭超 FENG Jing;TAN Chao(China University of Labor Relations,Beijing 100048,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]中国劳动关系学院经济管理学院,北京100048

出　　处：《中国卫生经济》2022年第12期113-115,共3页Chinese Health Economics

基　　金：中央高校基本业务费专项基金项目(21ZYJS008);国家社科基金一般项目(19BTJ040)。

摘　　要：目的:公立医院属于国有经济组织,对公立医院要形成内部审计与国家审计的合力,有利于加强审计监督力量。方法:利用博弈模型方法探寻内部审计、国家审计加强公立医院管理效果的有效监督方案。结果:加大国家审计机关的监督概率,增加对国家审计机关的奖励和加大对内部审计机构的惩罚都可以提高公立医院管理得力的概率。结论:加大国家审计机关的审计力度,优化审计的奖惩制度,能够提高公立医院的管理效果。Objective:Public hospitals belong to state-owned economic organisations,and the formation of a combined internal audit and state audit force for public hospitals is conducive to strengthening audit supervision power.Methods:Using the game model method,it explores the effective supervision scheme of internal audit and national audit for the public hospitals.Results:The probability of effective management of public hospitals can be raised by increasing the supervision probability of national audit institutions and strengthening rewards to national audit institutions and punishments to internal audit institutions-Conclusion:Increasing the audit strength of national audit institutions and optimizing the reward and punishment system of audit can promote the effective management of public hospitals.

关 键 词：公立医院 内部审计 国家审计 博弈模型 

分 类 号：R1-9[医药卫生—公共卫生与预防医学] F239[经济管理—会计学]