基于模糊博弈视角的企业联盟“双循环”合作对策研究  

Research on the“Dual Circulation”Cooperation Strategy of Enterprise Alliance from the Perspective of Fuzzy Game

作　　者：李翠 LI Cui(School of Information,Xi’an University of Finance and Economics,Xi’an 710100,China)

机构地区：[1]西安财经大学信息学院,陕西西安710100

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第1期141-146,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：陕西省社会科学基金项目(2021A003);西安市社会科学规划基金项目(JX174);西安市科技计划软科学研究项目(21RKYJ0062);中国(西安)丝绸之路研究院科学研究项目(2018SY04);西安财经大学科研计划项目(17FCJH01)。

摘　　要：企业合作在“双循环”新发展格局下呈现出更多的模糊特征,能否形成稳定的模糊合作格局及持续合作的收益再分配策略成为合作联盟的关注点。将广义模糊超量博弈和模糊凸博弈及其广义解集应用到“双循环”新发展格局下企业联盟合作与收益再分配中,提出最大广义模糊超量博弈模型及其广义模糊谈判集,并基于最大广义模糊超量博弈均衡性的视角,对模糊凸博弈下广义模糊谈判集与核心的等价性质进行论证。研究结果不仅满足了“双循环”新发展格局下合作企业以部分资源参与合作的意愿,及企业联盟模糊凸合作博弈下再分配方案等价性证明需求,而且实现了保留部分收益用于联盟再发展的策略。Fuzzy characteristics of enterprise cooperation are presented under the new development pattern of“dual circulation”,whether a stable fuzzy cooperation pattern can be formed and the income redistribution strategy of continuous cooperation has become the focus of the cooperative alliance.The generalized fuzzy excess game,fuzzy convex game and their generalized solution sets are applied to the cooperation and benefit reallocation of enterprise alliance under the new development pattern of“dual circulation”,the maximum generalized fuzzy excess game model and its generalized fuzzy bargaining set are proposed,and based on the perspective of the equilibrium of the maximum generalized fuzzy excess game,the equivalence between generalized fuzzy bargaining set and core in fuzzy convex game is demonstrated.The research results not only meet the willingness of partners to participate in cooperation with some resources,and meet the requirements of proving the equivalence of redistribution scheme under the fuzzy convex game formed by enterprise alliance cooperation,but also realize the strategy of retaining part of the benefit for alliance redevelopment.

关 键 词：企业联盟 双循环 模糊合作对策 广义模糊解 收益再分配 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]