买方风险下考虑创新信号传递的供应链贸易信贷决策研究  

Research on supply chain trade credit decision considering innovation signal transmission under buyer risk

作　　者：朱雪春[1] 杨思琳 ZHU Xue-chun;YANG Si-lin(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《科技与管理》2023年第1期77-88,共12页Science-Technology and Management

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2022SJZD028);江苏省教育科学“十四五”规划课题项目(C-c/2021/01/04)。

摘　　要：针对买方风险下创新信号传递如何影响供应链贸易信贷决策这一问题,建立创新水平信号传递博弈模型,分析质押担保资金、伪装水平、贸易信贷利率等对贸易信贷决策的影响。研究发现:分离均衡下,当买方传递高创新水平信号时,最佳策略是信贷;传递低创新水平信号时,只有当质押担保资金超过临界值时,信贷才是最佳策略;为使买方不偏离均衡,供应商需调整对两种买方企业的信贷利率。混同均衡下,质押担保资金较小时,创新能力强的买方市场占比大于临界值时,供应商才对其提供信贷;不信贷时,创新能力弱的买方会偏离均衡路径,对此供应商应合理收取信贷利率。本研究不仅可丰富买方风险和创新信号传递研究,也为供应链贸易信贷提供决策参考。The paper focuses on the central issue of how innovation signal transmission affects supply chain trade credit decisions under buyer risk,then establishes a game model based on innovation signal transmission.The effects of the pledge guarantee funds,camouflage level and trade credit interest rate on the trade credit decision is analyzed.The results show as follows.Under the separation equilibrium,when the buyer sends a high innovation signal,the supplier’s best strategy is trade credit.When the buyer sends low innovation signal,trade credit is the best strategy only when the pledge guarantee fund exceeds the critical value;In order to keep the buyer away from the equilibrium,the supplier needs to adjust the credit interest rate of the two buyer enterprises.Under confusion equilibrium,when pledge guarantee fund is small and the proportion of buyer’s market with strong innovation ability is greater than the critical value,supplier will conduct trade credit with it;In the case of no trade credit,the buyer with weak innovation ability will deviate from the equilibrium path,for which the supplier should reasonably charge the credit interest rate.This study can not only enrich the research of buyer risk and innovation signal transmission,but also provide reference for decision-making of supply chain trade credit.

关 键 词：创新信号 贸易信贷 买方风险 信号博弈 供应链 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]