论康德对本体论证明的反驳  

On Kant’s Refutation of the Ontological Argument

作　　者：李扬 Li Yang

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《德国哲学》2022年第1期122-143,343,共23页Chinese Journal of German Philosophy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金后期资助项目“康德认识对象理论研究”(项目编号:18FZX019)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：本文关注三个问题:康德反驳怎样的本体论证明?他如何反驳?面对质疑,他能否得到辩护?首先,康德反驳的本体论证明有普遍和具体之别,后者又分为笛卡儿派的和康德前批判时期的。整体来看,他的反驳不是基于单纯的逻辑分析,而是基于其认识论立场。其次,反驳可分为三层。第一,基于绝对必然存在者概念的三维分析,对本体论证明的普遍本质进行一般性反驳。第二,基于Sein双重意义的阐发,对笛卡儿派证明的前提“存有是一种实在性”进行反驳。一方面,康德对Sein不是实在谓词的阐明可重构为一个归谬论证,福吉和伍德等人对该论证的质疑,可分别从通盘规定原理和实存的认识论意义予以回应;另一方面,应从四个方面理解Sein的肯定意义。第三,基于对可能性和实存概念的精确规定,分别对笛卡儿派证明的第一个前提和结论进行反驳,这两种反驳对康德前批判时期的本体论证明同样有效。This paper focuses on three questions:What kind of ontological argument does Kant refute?How does he refute?In the face of criticism,can he be defended?First,the ontological arguments which Kant refuted can be distinguished between the universal and the concrete,and the latter is divided into Descartes’and pre-critique Kant’s.On a whole,Kant’s refutation is not based on pure logical analysis,but on his epistemological standpoint.Second,the refutation can be divided into three levels.First,based on the three-dimensional analysis of the concept of an absolutely necessary being,a general refutation to the universal essence of ontological argument is made.Second,based on the interpretation of Sein’s double meanings,he refutes the premise of the Cartesian argument that“being is a kind of reality”.Third,based on the precise definition of the concept of possibility and existence,the first premise and conclusion of the Cartesian argument are respectively refuted,which are equally valid for the ontological argument of Kant’s own of the pre-critical period.

关 键 词：本体论证明 上帝 存在 实在谓词 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学] B016