WEEE处理商激励制造商环境自我规制的逆向供应链协调策略  

Reverse supply chain coordination strategy for WEEE processor to motivate manufacturer to self-regulate environment

作　　者：任鸣鸣[1] 肖广来 黄佳丽 郭金森[1] 张流洋[1] 刘丛 REN Mingming;XIAO Guanglai;HUANG Jiali;GUO Jinsen;ZHANG Liuyang;LIU Cong(School of Business,Henan Normal University,Xinxiang 453007,China;School of Business,Henan University,Kaifeng 475001,China)

机构地区：[1]河南师范大学商学院,河南新乡453007 [2]河南大学商学院,河南开封475001

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2023年第2期665-680,共16页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目(17BGL139);国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目(71902055);河南省哲学社会科学规划资助项目(2021BJJ060,2019CJJ074)。

摘　　要：针对报废的电子电器设备(WEEE)环境污染严重、拆解成本高、效率低的问题,考虑制造商和处理商均进行环境自我规制,探讨处理商向环境自我规制产生溢出效应的制造商提供成本分担契约的逆向供应链决策、协调及实施策略。研究发现,处理商如果无视制造商的环境自我规制成本改善溢出,其“敲竹杠”行为将影响制造商的规制努力以及双方的长期合作和污染减排。考虑制造商环境自我规制成本改善溢出的研究发现,再制造零部件批发价格契约无法实现逆向供应链成员利润的Pareto改进;一定条件下的成本分担契约可以双双提升制造商与处理商利润,减少单位WEEE的污染排放量;制造商并不希望处理商分担更高的规制成本,可以通过Nash均衡讨价还价控制成本分担比例。不同于再制造零部件批发价格契约,在集中决策或成本分担契约下,溢出效应增加时处理商的规制努力水平也在提高。In view of the serious environmental pollution, high dismantling cost and low efficiency of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment(WEEE), considering the environmental self-regulation carried by both manufacturers and processors, the reverse supply chain decision-making, coordination and implementation strategy of cost sharing contract provided by processors to manufacturers with spillover effect of environmental self-regulation was discussed. The study found that if the processor ignored the manufacturers’ environmental self-regulation cost improvement spillover, its “rip-off” behavior would affect the manufacturers’ regulatory efforts as well as their long-term cooperation and pollution reduction. Considering the research on the improvement spillover of the manufacturer’s environmental self-regulation cost, it was found that the wholesale price contract of re-manufactured parts could not realize the profit Pareto improvement of the members of the reverse supply chain. Under certain conditions, the cost-sharing contract could increase the profits of both manufacturers and processors and reduce the pollution emission of WEEE unit. Manufacturers did not want processors to share the higher regulatory costs, but could control the cost-sharing ratio through Nash equilibrium bargaining. Unlike the wholesale price contracts for re-manufactured parts, when spillovers had increased under centralized decision or cost-sharing contracts, the regulatory efforts of processors also improved.

关 键 词：电器电子产品 报废的电子电器设备 环境自我规制 溢出效应 逆向供应链协调 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]