考虑消费者隐私的在线平台竞争模型研究  

The Study on Competition Model of Online Platforms with Concern of Consumers′Privacy

作　　者：鲍磊 赵文渲 张玄 BAO Lei;ZHAO Wenxuan;ZHANG Xuan(School of Economics and Management,Huaiyin Normal University,Huai′an Jiangsu 223001,China)

机构地区：[1]淮阴师范学院经济与管理学院,江苏淮安223001

出　　处：《江西师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2023年第1期36-44,共9页Journal of Jiangxi Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究一般课题(2022SJYB1901);国家自然科学基金面上课题(71973082)资助项目.

摘　　要：当消费者接入在线平台时,可以选择向在线平台提供一定数量的隐私信息以此获得更好的服务,与此同时,平台也可以通过隐私的披露获得收益.基于上述观察,该文构建了双寡头竞争模型,分析在线平台如何运用隐私披露策略展开竞争.研究发现:当消费者的估值较小时,平台选择披露隐私,并且采用低价甚至补贴吸引消费者的接入;当消费者的估值较大时,平台选择不披露隐私,服务的销售成为平台利润的唯一来源.研究表明:寡头竞争平台的最优隐私披露水平符合社会福利最大化的要求,垄断也不会导致平台过度披露消费者隐私.When consumers access the online platforms,they can choose to provide a certain amount of privacy information to the platforms in order to enjoy better services,meanwhile,the platforms can also benefit from the disclosure of privacy.Based on the above observations,a duopoly competition model is established to analyze how online platforms compete with each other by using privacy disclosure strategy.The results show that,the platforms choose to disclose privacy and use low pricing or even subsidy to attract consumers if the consumer′s valuation is low,choose not to disclose while yield profit only from the sales of services if the consumer′s valuation is high.The results suggest that,the optimal privacy disclosure level of the platforms under oligopolistic competition coincides with the requirement of social welfare maximizing,and monopolization will not result in excessive disclosure of consumers′privacy.

关 键 词：隐私披露 在线平台 双寡头竞争 福利分析 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理] F062.9[经济管理—国民经济]