股权激励对超额商誉的正向助推效应研究  

A Research on Positive Boosting Effect of Equity Incentive on Excess Goodwill

作　　者：刘翰林[1] 郑鑫波 LIU Han-lin;ZHENG Xin-bo(School of Accounting,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018,China)

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《杭州电子科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2023年第1期27-34,共8页Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University：Social Sciences

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学新兴(交叉)学科重大扶持课题子课题(9XXJC01ZD-1)。

摘　　要：文章以我国2007—2020年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察股权激励对超额商誉的影响。研究发现:相较于其他企业,实施股权激励的企业的超额商誉水平更高;作用机制检验表明,股权激励会增加第一类代理成本进而加剧超额商誉的形成;内部控制和机构投资者起到了调节作用,抑制了股权激励与超额商誉的正相关关系。研究结论揭示了股权激励对超额商誉的重要影响,为企业优化股权激励计划设计、完善内部控制建设以及监管部门加强并购活动监管、大力发展机构投资者提供了经验证据。This paper takes China’s 2007-2020 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a sample to investigate the impact of equity incentives on excess goodwill. The study found that compared with other enterprises, the excess goodwill level of enterprises implementing equity incentives was higher;the mechanism test showed that equity incentives would increase the cost of the first type of agency and thus exacerbate the formation of excess goodwill;the internal control and institutional investors played a role in regulating, weakening the positive impact of equity incentives on excess goodwill. The conclusions of the study reveal the important impact of equity incentives on excess goodwill, and provide the empirical evidence for enterprises to optimize their design of equity incentive plans, improve the construction of internal control, and strengthen the supervision of M&A activities by regulatory authorities and vigorously develop institutional investors.

关 键 词：股权激励 超额商誉 第一类代理成本 内部控制 机构投资者 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]