地方政府何以不断选择“过度”应急行为  

Why Do Local Governments Constantly Choose“Excessive”Emergency Behavior

作　　者：丁煌[1] 张绍飞 Ding Huang;Zhang Shaofei

机构地区：[1]武汉大学政治与公共管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《探索与争鸣》2022年第12期127-139,212,213,共15页Exploration and Free Views

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“地方政府公共政策执行行为选择机制的演化博弈分析”(72174155);国家社会科学基金重点项目“提高政策效能与地方政府公共政策执行力研究”(11AZZ004)。

摘　　要：在突发公共卫生事件场景下,“过度”应急行为何以不断被地方政府选择?基于“位置”变量的“结构-功能”分析框架,遵循“结构→功能→动机→行为”的逻辑顺序,可以发现,突发公共卫生事件应对形态由常转急后,问责模式、晋升模式和议程模式共同形成了地方政府应急行为选择的致因机制,而围绕“寻求问责结果最小化、力争晋升通道清晰化和急需触发频率稳定化”目标集合实现衍生出的“弱责”动机、“趋利”动机和“维稳”动机,组合生成了地方政府应急行为选择的动力机制。同时,受多层级官僚组织形成的政策执行易产生偏差空间与应急效能过度输出需求的综合作用,“过度”应急行为选择结果就此产生。此外,问责模式、晋升模式和议程模式的“结构稳定性”与“功能强制性”特点,为“过度”应急行为反复被选择现象提供了合理解释。In the context of public health emergencies,why are“excessive”emergency behaviors repeatedly selected by local governments?Based on the“structure-function”analysis framework of“location”variables,a comprehensive explanation is adopted and the logical sequence of“structure→function→motivation→be havior”is followed.After the response pattern of public health emergencies changed from normal to acute,accountability,promotion together with the agenda model formed the cause mechanism of local government’s emergency behavior selection.The motivation of“weak accountability”“profit-seeking”“stability maintenance”derived from the goal set realization of“seeking the minimization of accountability results,striving for the clearness of promotion channels and the urgent need for stabilization of trigger frequency”combine to generate the dynamic mechanism of local government’s emergency behavior selection.Meanwhile,the result of“excessive”emergency behavior selection comes into being due to the comprehensive effect of the policy implementation bias space formed by multi-level bureaucratic organization and the excessive output demand of local government emergency efficiency.In addition,the“structural stability”and“functional compulsion”characteristics of accountability model,promotion model and agenda model provide a reasonable explanation for the phenomenon that“excessive”emergency behavior is repeatedly selected.

关 键 词：突发公共卫生事件 地方政府 “过度”应急行为 结构功能主义 政策执行 

分 类 号：D035[政治法律—政治学]