创新新颖度、契约制度质量与企业研发外包倾向  

Innovative Novelty,Contract Enforcement and Firms'Propensity on R&D Outsourcing

作　　者：杨珍增[1] 郭晓翔 YANG Zhenzeng;GUO Xiaoxiang(School of Economics,Tianjin University of Finance and Economics,Tianjin 300222,China)

机构地区：[1]天津财经大学经济学院,天津300222

出　　处：《财经论丛》2023年第3期3-14,共12页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BGJ025);天津市研究生科研创新项目(2021YJSB356)。

摘　　要：本文考察企业在从事具有较高新颖度的创新项目时是否更倾向于实施研发外包。理论分析表明,随着创新项目新颖度的提高,研发外包的专业化分工收益上升,由不完全契约导致的风险下降,企业更倾向于将非核心研发活动外包,从而使自身更加专注于核心任务。利用世界银行创新跟踪调查数据的经验研究加以验证,发现企业实施研发外包的概率随创新项目新颖度的提高而显著上升,无论从哪个初始新颖度跃升都是如此,契约制度改善对上述影响存在显著的正向调节效应。该结论的政策含义在于:在企业创新能力和创新水平不断提高的背景下,相关政策应致力于促进技术交易市场的完善和发展,为研发外包提供良好的制度保障。One basic feature of China's economic development model in the new era is switching from highspeed growth stage to highquality development one.Enhancing the novelty of enterprise innovation is an important motivation for innovation-driven transformation and upgrading and high-quality development.By outsourcing part of R&D tasks,enterprises can not only obtain advanced knowledge and technology at lower cost,but also improve R&D performance,so as to formulate their unique competitive advantages.This paper examines whether enterprises are more inclined to implement R&D outsourcing when undertaking innovative projects with higher novelty and whether the improvement of contract enforcement can promote the implementation of R&D outsourcing.The decision of R&D outsourcing is the result of the trade-off between benefits and risks.The increase of innovation novelty can improve the profit of R&D outsourcing specialization,reduce the overall risk level and improve the net profit of R&D outsourcing,so enterprises are more inclined to outsource non-core R&D activities.At the same time,the distortion caused by incomplete contract can be corrected by the improvement of contract enforcement to some extent.When the quality of contract enforcement is high,the improvement of innovation novelty has stronger promoting effects on the probability of R&D outsourcing,and the contract enforcement has positive moderating effects.Using data of 7342 firms in 14 countries from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys Database and Innovation Follow-up Surveys Database to empirically test this standpoint through Probit model that the probability of enterprises implementing R&D outsourcing increases significantly with the improvement of the novelty of innovation projects,no matter which initial novelty the novelty level jumps from.This indicates that for innovation projects,enterprises tend to outsource part of the non-core R&D tasks so that they can focus more on the core tasks.The improvement of contract enforcement will increase the probability of

关 键 词：创新 新颖度 研发外包 契约制度 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]