碳限额与交易政策下不同权力结构绿色海运供应链博弈  

Game Analysis of Green Maritime Supply Chains with Different Power Structures under Cap-and-trade Policy

作　　者：梁志超 蒋冉 Liang Zhichao;Jiang Ran(Business School,University of Shanghai for Science and Technology,Shanghai 200093,China;Antai College of Economics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《经济研究导刊》2023年第4期77-82,共6页Economic Research Guide

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874108)。

摘　　要：在航运业碳减排背景下,为研究不同权力结构对采取不同减排措施的码头和船公司组成的两级海运供应链决策的影响,分别构建了碳限额与交易政策下码头为主导者、船公司为主导者的博弈模型及Nash博弈模型,并进行了碳价对供应链决策影响的数值分析。通过分析表明,相同减排措施下,码头、船公司分别作为主导者的供应链的总服务价格更高,但利润与碳排放更低;转换低硫油的供应链因其碳排放更高,而且更易受限额与交易政策的影响,碳交易价格的上升使其利润下降。In the context of carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry,this study investigates the influence of different power structures on the decision making of the two-echelon maritime supply chains composed of terminals and shipping companies that adopt different emission abatement measures.Three different game models with different power structures(a terminal-dominated game,a shipping company-dominated game,and a Nash game)are proposed,and a numerical analysis of the influence of carbon price on the supply chain decision making is conducted.The analysis shows that under the same emission reduction measures,the total service price of the supply chain in which the terminal and shipping company are the leading players is higher,but the profit and carbon emissions are lower.In addition,the supply chain switching to low-sulfur oil is more vulnerable to the cap-and-trade policy because of its higher carbon emissions,which makes it less profitable with increasing carbon trading price.

关 键 词：限额与交易政策 海运供应链 权力结构 碳减排 博弈论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] X196[经济管理—国民经济]