“任人唯贤”的制度悖论——以明代科举为例  

IAn Institutional Trilemma of“Meritocracy”:Evidence from Civil Service Examinations in the Ming Dynasty

作　　者：柯荣住 洪伟 郑恩营[5,6] Ke Rongzhu;Hong Wei;Zheng Enying

机构地区：[1]浙江大学民营经济研究中心 [2]浙江大学经济学院 [3]清华大学社会学系 [4]清华大学科技与社会研究中心 [5]北京大学国家发展研究院 [6]剑桥大学商业研究中心

出　　处：《社会学研究》2023年第1期96-115,共20页Sociological Studies

基　　金：北京大学人才启动项目(7101502649);浙江省哲学社会科学规划重大课题(22QNYC03ZD)的资助

摘　　要：本文总结了人才选拔的三个重要制度目标,即公平性、匿名性与有效性,并以这三者间的矛盾和取舍为框架梳理有关任人唯贤的文献与历史实践。基于我国科举制巅峰时期(明代中期)的制度细节和对中国传记数据库中12752名进士信息的量化分析,本文揭示了集中式人才选拔制度在其设计与执行过程中的悖论,即难以同时协调上述三个目标之间的冲突。研究发现,任人唯贤作为一种社会选拔制度,既受制于选拔者的能力与私利,又受制于区域或个体间的起点不公平。This paper summarizes three important institutional goals of talent selection,namely faimess,anonymity,and effectiveness,and uses the contradictions and trade-offs among these three as a framework to sort out the relevant literature and historical practices related to“meritocracy”.Based on the institutional details of the civil service examination system at its peak(mid-Ming Dynasty)and a quantitative analysis of information on 12752 jinshi in the Chinese biographical database,this paper reveals a trilemma of the centralized talent selection system in its design and implementation,namely,the difficulty of reconciling the conflicts armong the three at the same time.It finds that“meritocracy”as a social selection system is constrained by examiners'capability and private incentives,as well as by unequal starting points at regional or individual levels.

关 键 词：任人唯贤 科举 制度悖论 明代中期 定量分析 

分 类 号：D691.3[政治法律—政治学] K248[政治法律—中外政治制度]