考虑承包商过度自信和时间价值的激励契约研究  

Research on incentive contract considering contractor′s overconfidence and time value

作　　者：高尚 高文棋 周晶[1] 雷丽彩[2] GAO Shang;GAO Wenqi;ZHOU Jing;LEI Licai(School of Management and Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China;Business School,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China)

机构地区：[1]南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京210093 [2]湘潭大学商学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2023年第2期108-118,共11页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71732003);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071105)。

摘　　要：鉴于传统委托代理模型的分析框架未能充分反映承包商在工程项目中实际活动的现实,本文引入拓展的委托代理模型,同时考虑到承包商在施工过程中会存在过度自信倾向和时间价值,分析非对称信息情形下业主和承包商的利益博弈,探究承包商过度自信和时间价值对双方最优决策的影响。其中,承包商过度自信表现为低估项目风险,时间价值表征预期机会收益。本文进一步分析契约并与建立的两个基准契约模型比较,研究业主与承包商之间的最优激励契约设计问题。仿真结果表明考虑承包商过度自信和时间价值的激励契约起着降低业主期望总成本的作用,对于项目业主而言,识别承包商的类型并选择合适的风险分担系数可以有效激励承包商努力工作,实现双方利益目标一致。研究结果对业主设计最优激励契约具有一定的借鉴意义。In the special period of normalized epidemic prevention and control,the effective management of the time and cost is directly related to the economic and social benefits of owners in the face of the increasingly fierce competition environment in the engineering field.In addition,the information asymmetry between the owner and the contractor brings the contractor moral hazard.Therefore,how owners design incentive contracts to alleviate the conflict of interest between the two parties with inconsistent goals has become one of the most important and urgent issues in project management.In order to solve the problem of designing incentive contract between the owner and the contractor,the overconfidence tendency and time value of the contractor are incorporated into the extended principal-agent model here.The influence of the psychological and behavioral biases of the contractor on the decision-making of the owner and the contractor is explored more comprehensively so that the incentive contract made by the owner is closer to the reality.Due to the complexity and uncertainty of the project,the contractor problem in the actual project involves the optimization of the scheduling of project activities.Targeting the fact that the analysis framework of traditional principal-agent model cannot fully reflect the project scheduling problem from an agency perspective,the extended principal-agent model is established,more in line with the actual activities of the contractor in the process of project.Besides,traditional theoretical assumptions often regard the agents as completely rational people,which often cannot effectively explain the practical problems and weaken the effect of theory guiding practice.The contractors have overconfidence tendency and time value in the process of construction.So,how do these psychological and behavioral characteristics of the contractor influence the design of the owner′s incentive contract,and how can the owner recruit these characteristics to design the appropriate incentive contract?Both o

关 键 词：激励契约 过度自信 时间价值 委托代理理论 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]