线上零售商的新商品定价与销量信息披露策略分析  

Pricing and sales information disclosure strategies for online retailers’new products

作　　者：上官莉莉 缪朝炜[1] 蓝永泉 何一凡 邱盟 SHANGGUAN Lili;MIAO Zhaowei;LAN Yongquan;HE Yifan;QIU Meng(School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2023年第2期209-221,共13页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671151、71711530046);福建省自然科学基金资助项目(2022J01040)。

摘　　要：本文以价格及销售量信号为切入点,考虑在新商品质量存在差异化的条件下,由一个线上零售商和多个消费者构成的两级两阶段供应链。本文针对线上零售商不公开销售量和公开销售量两种不同情况,研究其如何利用价格、销售量向跟随型消费者传递新商品的质量信息,以最大化自身利益。本文通过理论和数值分析表明:对于低质量新商品而言,是否公开销售量信息对于零售商利润无影响。但对于高质量新商品而言,如果消费者对其定高价时新商品质量的信赖程度足够高时,零售商会更愿意不公开销售量,反之则公开。在线上零售商公开销售量的情况下,对于消费者保留价格的差异化程度较高的新商品,定价更高的零售商销售量也更高,而消费者保留价格的差异化程度较低的新商品,则是定价更低的零售商销售量更高。In recent years,with the continuous development of the online payment and logistics industry,online shopping has attracted an increasing number of consumers.Facing the increasing diversification of products and types of online consumers,the pricing strategies of online retailers for different-quality new products are becoming more complex.According to the different points of consumers′acceptance of new products,this paper divides the types of consumers into two categories:innovators and followers.Then,the paper constructs a two-stage game model considering that the online retailer transmits product quality signals to consumers through sales volume and price and sets optimal pricing strategies for different types of new goods.The first part studies the optimal decision and equilibrium performance of an online retailer selling different quality types of new goods under the information symmetry model.The results show that in the case of information symmetry,the retailer selling a low-quality new product cannot masquerade the product as a high-quality product.Therefore,the market naturally forms a separate equilibrium;that is,the high-and low-quality products set high and low prices,respectively.The second part studies the optimal decision and equilibrium performance of an online retailer in the case of nonpublic sales under the information asymmetry model.The results show that when the online retailer does not disclose the sales volume of the first stage,there may be three equilibrium performances:the separate equilibrium of low quality-low price and high quality-high price,the mixed equilibrium of low price with all new products and the mixed equilibrium of high price with all new products.The greater the degree of consumers′reserved price differentiation,the more likely it is to have a mixed equilibrium in which all new products are fixed at a high price.Otherwise,it is easy to have a mixed equilibrium in which all new products are fixed at a low price.Then,this paper studies the optimal decision and equilibri

关 键 词：线上零售商 销量信号 价格信号 质量差异化 定价决策 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]