政治概念观应当是政治的吗?  

Should the Conception of Politics be Political?

作　　者：尹不忧 YIN Buyou

机构地区：[1]天津师范大学法学院,300382。

出　　处：《国外社会科学前沿》2023年第1期70-84,共15页JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

摘　　要：在《政治自由主义》中,罗尔斯试图使得政治哲学独立于道德哲学。在罗尔斯看来,基于自由主义的合法性原则和理性的多元主义,政治概念观1应当仅仅在政治领域获得自身的正当化基础,也就是“政治概念观应当是政治的”。然而,我们无法基于自由主义的传统、稳定性和对公民自由的平等尊重来支持自由主义的合法性原则,而且自由主义的合法性原则违背了休谟原则。至于理性的多元主义,“判断的负担”的存在并不意味着各种学说都是理性的,而且我们无法找到一个适当的立场来将各种学说都评价为理性的,因此理性的多元主义也是不成立的。所以,罗尔斯对“政治概念观应当是政治的”这个主张的论证并不成功。从包括政治领域的整个价值领域获得正当化基础,能够使得政治概念观拥有更大的正当化强度并且履行追求真的谨慎的责任。因此政治概念观最好是综合的,而非政治的。In Rawl’s view, based on the principle of liberal legitimacy and the fact of reasonable pluralism, the conception of politics should only find its own justification basis in the political field, that is, the conception of politics should be political. However, we cannot support the principle of liberal legitimacy based on the liberal tradition, stability and equal respect for citizens. And the principle of liberal legitimacy violates the Hume Principle and is therefore invalid. Regarding reasonable pluralism, we cannot find an appropriate standpoint to evaluate various theories and believe that they are all reasonable. The existence of the burden of judgment does not mean that various theories are reasonable, so reasonable pluralism is invalid. Outside the political realm, that is ethics, morality, and other fields, to find a justification basis for political concepts can make political concepts have greater legitimization strength and fulfill the responsibility of pursuing true, caution. Therefore, the conception of politics is best to be comprehensive, that is, to find its own legitimate foundation in various fields of value, rather than political.

关 键 词：罗尔斯 政治自由主义 自由主义的合法性原则 理性的多元主义 休谟原则 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]