高管股票期权激励、社会责任与企业风险  

Executive Stock Option Incentive,Social Responsibility and Enterprise Risk

作　　者：魏立江 汪思卿 卢珊 WEI Lijiang;WANG Siqing;LU Shan(School of Business,AHUT,Ma’anshan 243032,Anhui,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学商学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出　　处：《安徽工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2022年第4期9-13,共5页Journal of Anhui University of Technology：Social Sciences

摘　　要：以2010-2017年授予股票期权的沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,检验高管股票期权激励和企业风险之间的关系以及社会责任在其中的调节作用。研究发现,高管股票期权激励与企业风险之间呈显著正相关关系,但在社会责任评分较高的公司中高管股票期权激励与企业风险之间正向关系有所减弱。Taking Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies that granted stock options from 2010 to 2017 as research samples,this paper examines the relationship between executive stock option incentives and corporate risks,and the moderating role of social responsibility.The study found that there is a significant positive correlation between executive stock option incentives and corporate risks,but it has weakened in companies with higher social responsibility scores between executive stock option incentives and corporate risks.

关 键 词：高管股票期权激励 企业风险 社会责任 

分 类 号：F272.5[经济管理—企业管理]