分析师盈利预测乐观偏差与高管减持寻租  

Optimistic Bias of Analysts' Earnings Forecast and Rent Extraction from Executives' Selling

作　　者：陈作华[1] 张芳芳 CHEN Zuo-hua;ZHANG Fang-fang(Accounting School,Shandong University of Finance and Economics,Jinan,Shandong,250014,China;Accounting School,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou,Zhejiang,310018,China)

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014 [2]浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《经济管理》2023年第1期169-190,共22页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金项目“薪酬差距、超额薪酬对高管减持行为的影响机理及监管对策研究”(ZR2022MG038);山东省自然科学基金项目“混改背景下非国有股东治理对山东省国有企业信息披露质量影响研究--基于年报文本挖掘的视角”(ZR2022QG012);浙江省社会科学界联合会研究课题“目标企业信息风险影响企业并购的机制及路径研究”(2021N90)。

摘　　要：有关分析师盈利预测乐观偏差影响因素研究已取得了丰硕的成果,但经济后果研究仍较为薄弱,且分歧较大。分析师盈利预测乐观偏差不利于信息环境的改善和资本定价效率的提升,因而可能会被公司高管机会主义地利用。为此,以2007—2021年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了分析师盈利预测乐观偏差对高管减持寻租的影响。研究发现:分析师盈利预测乐观偏差与高管减持寻租显著正相关。机制分析发现,分析师盈利预测乐观偏差加剧了股价错估程度和市场风险,从而为公司高管提供了更多减持寻租的机会。异质性分析发现,分析师盈利预测乐观偏差与高管减持寻租的正向关系在管理层自利性较强、公司业绩预告较为乐观时更明显,但二者关系在国有企业更弱。进一步检验发现,分析师盈利预测乐观偏差显著提高了高管机会主义减持的次数、规模以及减持时的择机性。本研究不仅丰富了分析师盈利预测经济后果研究,还对如何有效约束高管机会主义减持行为提供了新的视角。Executives’selling based on self-interest has produced more serious negative consequences.The China Securities Regulatory Commission has successively issued the“New Regulations on Selling Shares”,which aims to guide major shareholders,directors,supervisors and senior executives to sell their holdings in accordance with regulations and orderly,so as to minimize the damage to the interests of small and medium investors,so as to ensure the healthy and stable development of the capital market.Despite this,there is still a“selling wave”in China’s capital market after the stock price skyrockets,especially the“demon stocks”whose stock prices have risen sharply in the short term through conceptual speculation continue to appear.Executives’opportunistic selling has brought serious harm to the interests of investors and the development of the real economy,and has attracted strong attention from the public,media and regulatory agencies.Compared with external investors,executives can predict the impact of analysts’earnings forecast deviations on stock prices in a more timely manner,which is beneficial for executives to sell their holdings.Therefore,analysts’earnings forecast biases may be exploited opportunistically by executives,that is,analysts’earnings forecast biases will be exploited by the executives to seek rent extraction through selling shareholdings.The research on the determinants of analysts’earnings forecast optimistic bias has achieved fruitful results,but the research on economic consequences is still relatively weak and divergent.To this end,taking the 2007-2021 Chinese A-share listed companies as a sample,this paper empirically tests the impact of analysts’earnings forecast optimistic bias on executives’reduction in rent-seeking.The study found that both analysts’earnings forecast bias and earnings forecast optimism are significantly positively correlated with executives’selling abnormal return.When identifying the path,it is found that analysts’earnings forecast optimism

关 键 词：分析师盈利预测 乐观偏差 高管减持 寻租 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]