活跃度与补贴对O2O平台需求的影响机理及优化策略  

Research on the Effect Mechanism and Optimization Strategy of Activeness and Subsidy on Platform User Demand

作　　者：吴志樵[1] 康亚玲 罗健 唐加福[1] WU Zhi-qiao;KANG Ya-ling;LUO Jian;TANG Jia-fu(College of Management Science&Engineering,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;College of Management,Hainan University,Haikou 570228,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]海南大学管理学院,海南海口570228

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2023年第2期173-181,共9页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71831003,72172027)。

摘　　要：研究了商家活跃度和补贴水平对O2O(Online to Offline)平台需求的影响机理及用户需求随机下平台如何制定补贴策略的问题。首先,依托百度外卖(饿了么)实际运营数据特征,考虑商家活跃度和补贴水平下,构建时间序列与多元回归相结合模型,来有效识别活跃度与补贴带动用户需求的影响机理,结果表明,商家活跃度及补贴优惠能够有效带动用户需求。其次,进一步结合O2O用户即时需求与订单价格呈现的非线性相关特性,构建平台、商家、用户参与的序贯博弈模型,分析平台最优活跃度水平及最优补贴策略。结果表明,为获取总体收益最大,平台应依据商家交叉网络强度差异化实时调整补贴策略,进而灵活调控用户弹性。The Online to Offline(O2O)platform,connecting merchants with customers,has provided a trading venue for online transaction but offline experiencing.As an emerging two-sided platform,cross network effect promotes the explosive growth of O2O market scale.However,compared with conventional two-sided platform,the massive transaction data accumulated on the O2O platform are highly time-dependent,and the stochastic of users’on-demand makes real-time subsidy strategy become a more complex operation problem.By collecting the real-time transaction data of Baidu takeout platform(Ele.me),a model is proposed to analysis the effect mechanism of merchant activeness and subsidy level on user on-demand by combining time series and multiple regression model.The identified the mechanism enriched the classic cross-network effect theory.According to the nonlinear relation between users’on-demand and order price,a sequential game model is further constructed including platform manager,merchants,and users participated.Finally,the equilibrium solutions of activeness and subsidy are obtained,and the optimal policy is concluded for the platform.The results show that the active merchants and discount level significantly promote user demand.There is cross network effect between the merchant group and user group.Based on the conclusion above,it is further found that O2O platform can adjust subsidy level according to various cross network effect and further control user elasticity flexibility to maximize platform profits.There exists a threshold,such that for merchants with low cross network effect value,platform should control user elasticity to be inelastic via subsidy decision;otherwise,the control is elastic.Our findings present the following management implications for O2O platform.First,to capture user on-demand,our results suggest that platform should increase real-time subsidies during peak hours and popular business circles;Next,it is suggested that platform’s real-time subsidy should be titled towards discount,instead of redu

关 键 词：数据赋能 即时需求 网络效应 活跃度 补贴策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]