考虑返利赎回行为的商家入驻返利渠道策略研究  

Research on Strategy of Online Retailers Entering Rebate Channel Considering Consumer Rebate Redemption Behavior

作　　者：牟立峰[1] 唐鑫 MU Lifeng;TANG Xin(SILC Business School,Shanghai University,Shanghai 201899,China)

机构地区：[1]上海大学悉尼工商学院,上海201899

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2023年第2期166-172,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871133)。

摘　　要：考虑消费者返利赎回行为,基于消费者效用理论和Stackelberg博弈理论,分别构建集中式和分散式决策系统下网络零售商入驻第三方返利平台返利渠道的销售模型,研究网络零售商渠道选择策略和最优定价策略、第三方返利平台的最优返利策略,以及返利赎回行为、返利渠道便利性等因素对零售商和返利平台策略的影响。研究结果表明,通过调节消费者对返利渠道的接受程度和返利赎回概率,零售商可实现向双渠道转型;存在滑倒现象的集中式系统和分散式系统下,单一返利渠道策略时零售商可提高商品价格,而双渠道策略时商家不会改变商品价格,导致双渠道策略下价格虚假降低;为维持与零售商的合作,第三方返利平台可通过邮件、短信等形式刺激返利的赎回行为。Based on the consumer utility theory and Stackelberg Game theory,we construct the sales models of online retailers entering the rebate channels of the third-party rebate platforms under centralized and decentralizedsystem respectively when considering consumer rebate redemption behavior.The channel selection strategy and pricing strategy of an online retailer,the optimal rebate strategy of a third-party rebate platform and the impact of consumer rebate redemption behavior and convenience of rebate channel on these strategies are analyzed.The results indicate that online retailers canrealize the transformation from single rebate channel to dual-channel by adjusting consumers’acceptance of rebate channel and redemption probability of rebate.Rebate channel provides online retailer a chance to raise price through a single rebate channel,while pricing strategies remain unchanged under the dual-channel strategy both in centralized system and decentralized system,which results in the illusion of price reduction under the dual channel strategywhen considering consumer rebate redemption behavior.In order to maintain cooperation with online retailers,the third-party rebate platforms can stimulate consumers’rebate redemption behavior through email,SMS and other forms.

关 键 词：双渠道 赎回行为 定价策略 返利策略 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]