资产负债率对高管减持的影响  

Impact of Asset Liability Ratio on Senior Executives’Reduction in Holdings

作　　者：柏鑫 Xin Bai(School of Management Engineering,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing,Jiangsu)

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学管理工程学院,江苏南京210044

出　　处：《管理科学与研究（中英文版）》2023年第3期20-25,共6页Management Science and Research

摘　　要：近年来,高管减持行为屡见不鲜,因减持行为常伴有机会主义备受关注。本文以2007-2021年间沪深A股上市公司高管减持为研究对象,实证检验高资产负债率对高管机会主义减持起抑制作用。研究结果表明,高资产负债率会显著抑制企业高管的机会主义减持行为,在控制其内生性进行稳健性检验之后该结果依旧成立。本文的研究为有效减少高管机会主义减持行为提供了新思路,对完善我国股份减持制度有重要启示。In recent years,senior executives'stock reduction behavior is not uncommon,and it is often accompanied by opportunism,which has attracted much attention.This paper empirically examines the inhibitory effect of high asset liability ratio on executive opportunism reduction in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2021.The research results show that a high asset liability ratio can significantly inhibit the opportunistic reduction behavior of corporate executives,and the results are still valid after controlling its endogenous robustness for a robustness test.The research in this article provides a new idea for effectively reducing the opportunistic shareholding reduction behavior of senior executives,and has important implications for improving China's shareholding reduction system.

关 键 词：资产负债率 机会主义减持行为 协同治理 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]