波普尔证伪主义思想中的证实倾向  

The Confirmatory Tendency in Popper’s Falsificationism Thought

作　　者：林艳 雷嘉祺 LIN Yan;LEI Jiaqi(School of Philosophy,History and Culture&Biquan Academy,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学碧泉书院·哲学与历史文化学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《湖南人文科技学院学报》2023年第2期9-15,共7页Journal of Hunan University of Humanities,Science and Technology

摘　　要：波普尔在其证伪主义的理论体系中一再强调“证伪”,反对“证实”,倡导与逻辑实证主义迥然不同的理论主张。波普尔反对“证实”思想的实质是他要坚决反对归纳主义的方法论。实际上,波普尔所反对的主要是早期归纳主义的不完全归纳方法,他提出的“逼真性”概念与逻辑经验主义的确证性概念具有很大的相似性,使其证伪主义的理论基础增添了“证实”色彩。他提出的另一概念“可否证度”同样也揭示了证伪主义对于“趋近于真理”的追求,这些关键性概念的内涵与逻辑实证主义的理论主张在某种程度上来说是契合的。波普尔的证伪主义思想中包含着一定的证实倾向。In his theoretical system of falsificationism,Popper repeatedly emphasized“falsification”and opposed“confirmation”,advocating a theory that was completely different from logical positivism.The essence of Popper’s objection to the idea of“confirmation”is that he firmly opposed the methodology of induction.In fact,what Popper opposed was mainly the incomplete induction method of early induction.The concept of“verisimilitude”proposed by Popper had great similarity with the concept of confirmability of logical empiricism,which added“confirmative”color to the theoretical basis of his falsificationism.“Verifiability”,another concept Popper proposed,also reveals the pursuit of falsificationism for“approaching truth”.The connotation of these key concepts is consistent with the theory of logical positivism to some extent.Therefore,Popper’s falsifiationism contains a certain tendency of confirmation.

关 键 词：证伪主义 证实 真理观 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]