自由的价值与道德生物增强的限度  

The Value of Freedom and the Limits of Moral Bioenhancement

作　　者：徐向东[1] 陈玮[1] Xu Xiangdong;Chen Wei

机构地区：[1]浙江大学哲学学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2023年第2期126-137,F0003,共13页World Philosophy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金2020年度后期资助项目“道德责任与能动性”(项目编号:20FZXB055);国家社会科学基金2020年度重大项目“人类道德行为的进化与社会文化心理机制研究”(项目编号:20&ZD039)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：在目前所能设想的人类增强技术中,通过生物医学手段来增强人类道德被认为是最没有争议的。但是否确实如此关键地取决于我们对道德的本质和来源及其在人类生活中的地位的认识和理解。通过集中考察英格玛·佩尔松和朱利安·萨瓦勒斯库对道德生物增强提出的倡议,本文尝试表明,鉴于人类道德生活的复杂性、多样性和开放性,鉴于我们目前对人类道德行为的神经生物学基础仍然缺乏充分明晰和系统的认识,利用生物医学手段来直接干预大脑以“增强”人类道德的做法不仅并不成熟,而且也未能充分正视自由与其他重要的人类价值之间错综复杂的关系。Among the forms of human enhancement technology conceived at the present,enhancing human morality by way of biomedical means is least controversial.However,whether it is the case crucially depends on our knowledge and understanding of the nature and origins of human morality and its place in human life as well.By focusing on the project to enhance human morality proposed by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu,this paper is aimed to show that owing to the complexity,diversity,and openness,and in consideration of the fact that fully explicit and systematic knowledge of the neurobiological foundations of human moral behavior is still lacking at the present,the attempt to modulate the brain directly by bio-medical means to‘enhance’human morality is not merely premature,but it also fails to fully envisage the complicated relationship between freedom and other important human values.

关 键 词：道德生物增强 自由 直接干预 上帝机器 道德能动性 

分 类 号：B82-05[哲学宗教—伦理学]